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Abstract
This thesis proposes an Intrusion Detection System, WiFi Miner, which applies an
infrequent pattern association rule mining Apriori technique to wireless network packets
captured through hardware sensors for purposes of real time detection of intrusive or
anomalous packets. Contributions of the proposed system includes effectively adapting
an efficient data mining association rule technique to important problem of intrusion
detection in a wireless network environment using hardware sensors, providing a solution
that eliminates the need for hard-to-obtain training data in this environment, providing
increased intrusion detection rate and reduction of false alarms.

The proposed system, WiFi Miner solution approach is to find frequent and infrequent
patterns on pre-processed wireless connection records using infrequent pattern finding
Apriori algorithm also proposed by this thesis. The proposed Online Apriori-Infrequent
algorithm improves the join and prune step of the traditional Apriori algorithm with a rule
that avoids joining itemsets not likely to produce frequent itemsets as their results,
thereby improving efficiency and run times significantly. A positive anomaly score is
assigned to each packet (record) for each infrequent pattern found while a negative
anomaly score is assigned for each frequent pattern found. So, a record with final positive
anomaly score is considered as anomaly based on the presence of more infrequent
patterns than frequent patterns found.

Keywords: Data mining, wireless network intrusion detection, Apriori, infrequent
patterns, training data.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Security of computer networks has become the most crucial issue nowadays.
Traditionally, we consider the firewall as the first line of defense, but the unsophisticated
firewall policy cannot meet the requirements of some organizations, which need high
security [XQJ01]. Many studies and research have been done already in this field and still
this field is getting a lot of attention from researchers and professionals. There are many
methods and models like ADAM [BCJ+01], MADAMID [LSOO], MINDS [ELK+04],
DHP [LXY03], LERAD [MC03], ENTROPY [Yo03] already present today to resolve
this problem, but all of them are based on wired network environment. In the last few
years, wireless technology has advanced rapidly in user convenience and flexibility but
few studies have been done on intrusion detection of wireless network. This is why
security of wireless network or detecting intrusion on wireless network has become an
important issue among researchers today.

There are two kinds of traditional IDSs [BK03]: 1) misuse detection model and 2)
anomaly detection model. Misuse IDS, which uses well-known attack patterns to detect
intrusion, for example, models [De87] [SGF+02] [SZ02] [KTK02] which are efficient at
catching previously known intrusions, but unable to detect new intrusions based on
previously known intrusions. Anomaly IDS, on the other hand can analyze previous
intrusion patterns and based on previous patterns it can detect new anomalous patterns.
That is why nowadays "Data Mining" has become a vital part in network intrusion
detection. The intrusion detection model is an old concept, which was first introduced by
Denning in [De87]. But data mining is a newer concept in the network intrusion detection
model. Research in this area started as early as 1998/ 1999, [LSM99] [LS98] [LP99].
Many studies have been done on how data mining concept can be used efficiently to
improve the performance of network intrusion detection model [Le02][Yo03][MC03]
[NC03] [BCL02] [BK03] [LS98] [LSC+Ola] [LSC+Olb]. The newest concern in this
field is how to implement data mining based IDS for wireless network. To understand
this more clearly, we need to know what is "Data Mining", what is "wireless network"
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and what is "Network Intrusion Detection''' separately then we can concentrate on how
they can be merged together.
Data Mining is knowledge discovery in databases. Data mining techniques help us to
discover hidden patterns in database automatically. As a definition, we can say that Data
mining is the automated process of extracting hidden predictive information from a large
database. In other words, data mining is automated statistical analysis [Th05].
As we know Internet is the network of networks and nowadays almost all the local
networks are somehow connected to the outside networks or Internet. Currently, with the
growing size of the World Wide Web, the network is also becoming more complex and
new intrusions or attacks are coming out every day. To detect an intrusion all the systems
use sensors in form of either hardware or software to monitor the network traffic and
raise alarms when they match saved patterns [CGOO]. Security analysts decide whether it
is a false alarm or a true alarm, then respond accordingly.
Wireless networks are commonly implemented because of the ease of deployment and
their ability to provide network access to areas where running cable is not an option.
Wireless networks allow employees to roam offices and buildings and provide guests
with internet access. However, this same ease of access and mobility can also be
leveraged by malicious individuals, who launch attack from the most unlikely of
locations. Wireless networks do not have defined borders and air waves can penetrate
unintended areas allowing attackers to bypass perimeter firewalls, sniff sensitive
information, access internal network or attack wireless hosts without direct access to the
network. Proper design of a wireless network can help minimize wireless threats, but like
wired networks, defense in depth should be implemented to minimize risk [DH06].
If the network is small and signatures are kept up to date, then an analyst can observe all
alarms and can determine the type of attack, if it is a new or old type of attack. But as the
network grows and becomes more complex, human analyst will be overwhelmed with all
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alarms produced by the system daily. Data Mining can help automate the process so that
it can detect new intrusions without the too much help from a human analyst.
Data mining can be very helpful in finding intrusions in networks. For this purpose, all
inbound and outbound network traffics are kept in a database and interesting or
informative parameters like source IP, destination IP, source MAC address, destination
MAC address, timestamps etc are extracted from the database during preprocessing
phase. Then, these preprocessed data act as input to data mining model and various data
mining techniques like association rule, clustering rule, classification rule are applied to
find hidden relationships or rules among these parameters. These new rules are applied to
detect any substantial deviation of incoming network traffic to flag it as an anomaly or
new type of attack. Data mining has been proven to be efficient in wired intrusion
detection system in various works done by many researchers, which include ADAM
[BCJ+01], MADAMID [LSOO], MINDS [ELK+04], DHP [LXY03], LERAD [MC03]
etc. Two major limitations of these data mining based network intrusion detection
systems are high rate of false alarm and these systems can be deployed only over wired
network. There are two groups of researchers focused on reducing the rate of false alarms
using data filters. One group [BCH+01] [BTS+01] used data filters before data are sent to
the classifier to be trained. Another group [CGOO] used data filters on the output (alarms)
of an existing intrusion detection system. The second limitation is more concerning since
almost all devices support wireless communication and networks are going from wired to
wireless mode. There are many commercial products like AirMagnet [Air08a],
AirDefense [Air08b] which offer the functionality of detecting wireless attacks but all are
equivalent to misuse intrusion detection systems of wired NIDS, which use "signatures"
to detect attacks whose behaviors are well understood. Very recently, data mining has
been taken into consideration to enhance the power of intrusion detection capability for
wireless networks. We can see that clustering technique has been adopted in [ZKN05]
and association technique has been adopted in [LLM+07] [ZZW08] to detect intrusions in
wireless networks, which are data mining based Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems
(WIDS).
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This thesis work proposes a network intrusion detection system for wireless environment
using wireless sensor to capture wireless traffic and an online apriori based data-mining
algorithm to detect new attacks. Our proposed algorithm (the Real-time Online Apriori
algorithm), which has introduced the technique for the first time to analyze the incoming
dataset and find infrequent patterns without any prior training with safe data, can detect
new types of wireless attacks efficiently with a reduced complexity in comparison to
traditional apriori based systems and can flag anomalous connections in real time on the
fly.

1.1.

Thesis

Contribution

This thesis proposes a wireless intrusion detection system called WiFi Miner, with the
following objectives:
1. Eliminating the need for hard-to-get training data. This it does with a proposed
Online Apriori-Infrequent algorithm, which does not use the confidence value
parameter and does not create any rules, but efficiently uses only frequent and
non-frequent patterns in a record to compute an anomaly score for the record to
determine whether this record is anomalous or not on the fly.
2. Real-Time Detection of Intrusions: This, our system does by integrating
proprietary hardware sensors, where streams of wireless packets (e.g., MAC
frames) from Access Points (AP) are promptly captured and processed with the
proposed Online Apriori-Infrequent algorithm.
3. Our proposed Real-time Online Apriori-Infrequent algorithm improves the join
and prune steps of the traditional Apriori algorithm, detects frequent and
infrequent patterns in connection records and increase the efficiency and run times
significantly. The proposed system targets mostly active wireless attacks, which
are not easily detected by existing wired IDSs.
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1.2. Outline of Thesis
The thesis is organized as follows: the rest of chapter l introduces network intrusion
detection system concept for both wired and wireless environments, differences between
wired and wireless intrusion and classification of wireless attacks. Chapter 2 discusses
how data mining can be used in the field of intrusion detection, major data mining
approaches for NIDS, current existing network intrusion detection systems for wired
network and wireless intrusion detection systems, their limitations and technologies.
Chapter 3 explains our proposed system's algorithm and technology. Chapter 4 describes
the experimental results of our system and finally chapter 5 presents conclusions and
future directions.

1.3. Network Intrusion Detection for wired

network

Definition: Network Intrusion detection System (NIDS) is a type of security management
system for networks. An NIDS collects and analyzes information from various areas
within a network to identify possible security breaches, which include both intrusions or
attacks from outside the network and from within the network. According to [HLM+ 90],
network intrusions are, "Any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity,
confidentiality or availability of a resource". It does not include local intrusions like filesystem virus, local brute force password testing etc [EDA08].

1.3.1. Type of Intrusions:
According to [EDA08], primarily there are four kinds of intrusions:
•

User to Root Attack (U2R)

•

Remote to User Attack (R2U)

•

Denial of Service Attack (DoS)

•

Probes Attack (Probes)
5
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The most severe attacks are categorized as U2R and the order of severity can be
organized as U2R > R2U > DoS > Probes. According to research it is found that current
data mining based IDSs are more useful on capturing DoS and Probes attacks than
capturing U2R and R2U attacks [EDA08].

1.3.2. User to Root Attack:
This category consists of attacks where a local user on a machine is able to obtain
privileges normally reserved for the UNIX super user or the Windows NT administrator.
Intruder exploits some software vulnerabilities to gain root access. Examples of U2R
attack are Eject and Fbconfig.
The most common User to Root attack is buffer overflow attack, which enables the
attacker to run personal code on a target machine once the boundary of a buffer has been
exceeded, giving him the privileges of the overflowed program (which in most cases is
root). This type of attack usually tries to execute a shell with the application's owner
privileges. Some examples of those attacks are eject, ffbconfig etc.
The eject attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in eject program. "Eject" is a
utility distributed in Sun Solaris 2.5. This "eject" utility is used by the removable media
devices that do not have an eject button or that are managed by the Volume Management.
Due to an insufficient bound checking of the arguments in the volume management
library, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of "eject". If it is exploited, this
vulnerability can be used to gain root access [RB03].. According to [RB03], "The Eject
attack consists of 4 steps: i) inject the exploit script to the victim's host computer; ii)
compile the exploit script; iii) execute the compiled exploit script; and iv) use the root
console. If the exploit script is already in the victim's host and if it has been compiled,
then the first two steps become unnecessary."
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The attack traces consist of hundreds or thousands of lines of system calls. However,
there are only a couple of system call sequences that are sufficient to completely define
the attack. Another identifying string that characterizes the eject exploit is usr/bin/eject or
existence of string ./ejectexploit or ./eject [RB03].
1.3.3. Remote to User Attack:
In this type of attack, the attacker does not have any user account in the victim system.
By exploiting some software vulnerabilities and sending network packets, the user gain
normal access and later he can launch U2R attack and gain root access.
An example of this kind of attack is Sendmail attack. The Sendmail attack exploits a
buffer overflow in UNIX version 8.8.3 of sendmail and allows a remote attacker to
execute commands with superuser privileges. By sending a carefully crafted email
message to a system running a vulnerable version of sendmail, intruders can force
sendmail to execute arbitrary commands with root privilege.
According to [Linc07], in this type of attack, the attacker sends carefully constructed mail
message with a long MIME header field. Sendmail daemon overflows during MIME
processing and adds a new entry to the password file. Attacker comes back later and finds
that his mail message has given him a root account on the victim system. The simulation
of the attack is described below.
The implementation consists of a carefully constructed mail message which, when sent to
the victim machine with a vulnerable version of sendmail, adds a new entry with root
privilege to the end of the password file on the victim system. Once this new entry has
been added, the attacker can log into the machine as this new user and execute commands
as a root user. Initially, the attacker sends a carefully crafted e-mail message to the victim
machine. After that the sendmail daemon starts to process this message, overflows one of
its buffers, and executes the attacker's inserted commands that create a new entry in the
password file. Then, the attacker comes back to the victim machine and uses the new
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password file entry to gain root access to the victim machine and perform some malicious
actions.

1.3.4. Denial of Service Attack:
DoS is a type of attack on a network that is designed to bring the network down by
flooding it with useless traffic. Although a DoS attack does not usually result in the theft
of information or other security loss, it can cost the target person or company a great deal
of time and money. Typically, the loss of service is the inability of a particular network
service, such as e-mail, to be available or the temporary loss of all network connectivity
and services. A denial of service attack can also destroy programming and files in
affected computer systems. In some cases, DoS attacks have forced Web sites accessed
by millions of people to temporarily cease operation. Examples of this kind of attack are
SYN flood attack, Teardrop attack, Smurf attack etc.

According to [Linc07], A SYN Flood is a denial of service attack to which every TCP/IP
implementation is vulnerable (to some degree). Each half-open TCP connection made to
a machine causes the 'tcpd' server to add a record to the data structure that stores
information describing all pending connections. This data structure is of finite size, and it
can be made to overflow by intentionally creating too many partially-open connections.
The half-open connections data structure on the victim server system will eventually fill
the buffer to hold new incoming connections and the system will be unable to accept any
new incoming connections until the table is emptied out. Normally there is a timeout
associated with a pending connection, so the half-open connections will eventually expire
and the victim server system will recover. However, the attacking system can simply
continue sending IP-spoofed packets requesting new connections faster than the victim
system can expire the pending connections. As a point of reference, sending 20 SYN
packets to a port on a Solaris 2.6 system will cause that port to drop incoming requests
for approximately ten minutes [Linc07].

8

WiFi Miner: An Online Apriori and Sensor Based Wireless Network Intrusion Detection System

1.3.5. Probes Attack:
Probes attack itself does not do anything other than scanning all reachable ports of
computers in a network, gathers information, and looks for security holes in the network.
Later this information can be used to launch other types of attacks and cause more
damage to the network. Examples of this kind of scanning tools are Ipsweep, Mscan etc
[EDA08].
An Ipsweep attack is a surveillance sweep to determine which hosts are listening on a
network. This information is useful to an attacker in planning attacks and searching for
vulnerable machines. There are many methods an attacker can use to perform an Ipsweep
attack. The most common method is to send ICMP Ping packets to every possible address
within a subnet and wait to see which machines respond [Linc07]. Then, the attacker can
determine which ports on which machines are open and then he can plan to launch other
attacks through that open port.

1.4. Network Intrusion Detection for wireless

network

The primary purpose of a Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) is to detect
unauthorized wireless access to local area networks and other information assets.
According to [Wiki08], these systems are typically implemented as an overlay to an
existing Wireless LAN infrastructure, although they may be deployed standalone to
enforce no-wireless policies within an organization.

1.4.1. Wireless network classification:
According to the network formation and architecture wireless network can be broadly
classified into two categories:
•

Infrastructure based wireless network

•

Ad-hoc network
9
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1.4.2. Infrastructure based wireless network:
In infrastructure based network, there are fixed Wireless Access Points (WAP) and a set
of client devices. WAPs are usually connected to a wired network and relay data between
client devices on each side. Nowadays, most of the connections among wireless devices
occur over infrastructure based service provider like laptops connected to the internet via
WAPs. A popular example of this infrastructure based wireless network is WLAN or
Wireless Local Area Network.

WLAN (Wireless LAN):
With this WLAN users can establish wireless communication within a local area,
typically within 100 meters [LLM+07]. WLAN can operate in two modes: Infrastructure
based mode and independent (Ad-hoc) mode. In an infrastructure WLAN wireless
stations are connected to a wired network such as Ethernet via WAPs. In this network,
wireless devices can move within the range of WAP without any disruption to the
connection.

In independent WLAN, wireless stations within a limited area form a

temporary network without using WAPs. This concept is similar to Ad-hoc network,
which is described in the next sub-section.
Access Point
(Root Unit)
Wired LAN
Access Point
,...---->----.,,. (Root Unit)

WLAN1

\

.,'."

Figure 1: Infrastructure based Wireless LAN
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1.4.3. Ad-hoc Network:
According to [Mob07], an ad-hoc (or "spontaneous") network is a local area network or
other small network, especially one with wireless connections, in which some of the
network devices are part of the network only for the duration of a communications
session or, in the case of mobile or portable devices, while in some close proximity to the
rest of the network. In Latin, ad hoc literally means "for this," further meaning "for this
purpose only," and thus usually temporary. Ad-hoc networks can perform as stand-alone
networks meeting direct communication needs of their users.
For example, Ad-hoc network allows people to come to a conference room and, using
infrared transmission or radio frequency (RF) wireless signals, join their notebook
computers with other people in the conference to a local network with shared data and
printing resources. Each user has a unique network address that is immediately
recognized as part of the network. The technology would also include remote users and
hybrid wireless/wire connections. In this case, the duration of this temporary network
would be the duration of the meeting.

_
message

j T message j ^ T ^ T * ^ "
mKm^

^ ^ \

message ^ ^ • F message

>L *—m

Figure 2: Ad-hoc Wireless Network
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1.4.5. Wireless standard for WLAN (IEEE 802.11):
IEEE 802.11, commonly known by Wi-Fi, denotes a set of Wireless LAN standards
developed by working group 11 of the IEEE LAN/MAN Standards Committee (IEEE
802) in 1997. These standards describe everything about Wi-Fi, such as components of
the wireless architecture, logical service interfaces, overview of the services, differences
between wired LAN and wireless LANs, MAC service definitions, frame formats,
authentication and privacy, layer management etc [IEEE 802.11, 1999]. The term
802.llx is also used to denote the set of amendments to the standard. The 801.22b
standard is the first widely used standard and is known as Wi-Fi. Later in 2003, 801.1 lg
standard was developed to operate in the same 2.4 GHz band as in 801.11b but with a
higher speed of 55 Mbps. Currently, both of them denote Wi-Fi standards.

The built-in security features of 802.11 are provided largely by the Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP) protocol. In wireless LANs, clients need to be connected with Wireless
Access Points (WAPs) in order to communicate with other clients. WEP only provides
the security that only authorized clients can be connected to the WAP by providing a
correct password phase or a key. Because 802.1 Ib/g has been so widely adopted, the
security weaknesses related to WEP and the standard have been exposed and now it is
easily breakable [LLM+07].

1.4.6. Differences between Wired Intrusion Detection and Wireless
Intrusion Detection:
The main difference between wired and wireless intrusion detection is that in wired
environment the data are transmitted through wire or cable and to detect or intrude into
the network, attacker needs to have physical connection over a cable to the network. But
in wireless network data are transmitted over air and Wireless networks do not have
defined borders and air waves can penetrate into unintended areas allowing attackers to
12
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bypass perimeter firewalls, sniff sensitive information, access the internal network or
attack wireless hosts without direct access to the network.
Before knowing the details of wireless and wired IDS, let us know how data is
transmitted over network and what OSI (Open System Interconnection) model is. Each
piece of information transmitted on a wired or wireless network is sent as packets. A
packet has several layers; different layers are dedicated to different specific tasks.
Formation and functions of packets can be described best with OSI model which has
seven layers. The OSI model is as follows:
OSI Model
Data
Data
OctiJ

|
I

" i v •"••'••

Presentation
,Vf1 '. r r rp\ it-T

Sess'oii

Data

/"'

Layer
Application

H I ' T I ' J ^ : i.oint iur.il il it •

\'

Segments]
.V
Packets

Transport

Network

Path Delemilmtllon
mii IP {Logical Addressing)

Figure 3: OSI Model

A wireless IDS is unique in that it detects attacks against the 802.11 frame at layer two
(Data Link Layer) of the wireless network. This layer 2 (Data Link) is also different in
wired and wireless packets. The headers of both packets are shown in figure 4. The upper
part of figure 4 shows the wireless (802.11) header format and the lower part of the figure
shows the wired (802.3) MAC header format.
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S02.1 1 M A C header

Wireless
MAC Header
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Control
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802.3

Wired MAC
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Address
1

2 Bytes
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6

Address
3

Sequence
Control
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Bytes

Address
4
6

Bytes

( E t rl e r n e t )

Dest.
Address

Source
Address

T y p e or
Length
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6

2

Bytes

Address
2

Bytes

Figure 4: Difference between wired and wireless packet in Data Link Layer

This data link layer contains MAC frames. There are three different types of 802.11
(wireless) MAC frames: data frame, control frame and management frame. Data frames
carry protocols and data from higher layers within the frame body. A data frame, for
example, could be carrying the HTML code from a Web page (complete with TCP/IP
headers) that the user is viewing. Management frames enable stations to establish and
maintain communications. The majority of wireless attacks target management frames,
because they are responsible for authentication, association, beacons, probe
requests/response etc. 802.11 control frames assist in the delivery of data frames between
stations. More detailed information on different types of MAC frames can be found at
[Wifi07]. Figure 5 shows the general header format of a wireless MAC data frame and
the lower part of figure 5 shows the fields in Frame Control in details.
802.11 MAC header

j Frame
j Control

Duration Address Address Address Sequence] Address
3
Control
4
ID
1
2

2 Bytes 2 Bytes

Details of 2 Bytes
(16 bits) in Frame
Control

6 Bytes

Protocol
Version

Type

Subtype

2 bits

2 bits

4 bits

6 Bytes

To
DS
1 bit

6 Bytes

From
DS
1 bit

2 Bytes

More
Frag
1 bit

6 Bytes

Retry

1 bit

Power
Mgmt

Oto 2312 Bytes 4 Bytes!

More
Data

1 bit

Figure 5: MAC header format and illustration of Frame Control Bytes
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Wireless threats like man-in-the middle attacks, rogue access points, war drivers and
denial of service attacks function within the 802.11 frames and cannot be detected on
layer three (Network Layer) past the access point. Wired IDS will not receive these
frames, because management frames are not forwarded to upper layers of the OSI model
[DH06].

1.4.7. Wireless Intrusion Types:
Wireless intrusions can be broadly categorized into four categories [Sh04]:
1. Passive attacks
2. Active attacks
3. Man-in-the middle attacks and
4. Jamming attacks.
Let us review what these attacks mean to the wireless network.
(1) Passive Attack:
A passive attack occurs when someone listens to or eavesdrops on network traffic
[Sh04]. Armed with a wireless network adaptor that supports promiscuous mode, the
eavesdropper can capture network traffic for analysis using easily available tools, such as
Network Monitor in Microsoft products, or TCPdump in Linux-based products, or
AirSnort in Windows or Linux. A passive attack on a wireless network may not be
malicious in nature. In fact, many in the war driving (war driving is the act of searching
unsecured Wi-Fi networks by a person with a Wi-Fi equipped computer) community
claim their war driving activities are harmless or educational in nature. It is worth noting
that war driving, looking for and detecting wireless traffic is probably not illegal, even
though propagandistic claims to the contrary are often made. Wireless communication
takes place on unlicensed public frequencies—anyone can use these frequencies. This
makes protecting a wireless network from passive attacks more difficult.
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Examples of passive attack are wardriving, eavesdropping etc. Currently, there are many
software and tools available for this war driving activity. War driving tools can help an
, attacker to find and pinpoint available wireless networks. Examples of this kind of tools
are NetStumbler for Windows [Sh04], Kismet for Linux [Hu04], KisMac for Macintosh
[Hu04] etc. After finding a wireless network, an attacker can do the eavesdropping. In
eavesdropping, an attacker simply listens to a set of transmissions to and from different
hosts even though the attacker's computer is not taking part to the transaction. Many
relate this type of attack to a leak, in which sensitive information could be disclosed to a
third party without legitimate users' knowledge. To prevent an eavesdropping attack, one
must encrypt the contents of a data transmission at several levels, preferably using SSH,
SSL. Otherwise, large amounts of traffic containing private information are passed
through air, just waiting for an attacker to listen in and collect the frames for further
illegitimate analysis.

(2) Active Attacks:
Once an attacker has gained sufficient information from the passive attack, the hacker can
then launch an active attack against the network. There are a potentially large number of
active attacks that a hacker can launch against a wireless network. For the most part,
these attacks are identical to the kinds of active attacks that are encountered on wired
networks. These include, but are not limited to, unauthorized access, MAC spoofing,
Denial of Service (DoS) and Flooding attacks.
Once an attacker has found an unsecured wireless network by war driving, he can do the
eavesdropping, which is a passive attack and can gain the valid MAC addresses
associated with the network. Later he can spoof his MAC address to that authorized MAC
address and easily access the network. Even if someone's MAC address is prohibited to a
certain network, he can spoof his MAC address to some other MAC address and access
the network. Currently, there are many software available in the internet for this MAC
spoofing.
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Spoofed access points are another problem with the wireless networks, even with WEP
authentication. Clients are typically configured to associate with the access point with the
strongest signal. An attacker can simply spoof the SSID (the name of the network) of an
access point and clients will automatically associate with it and pass frames and
messages. Here is where an attacker can capture traffic with time, determine the WEP
key used to authenticate and encrypt traffic on the wireless network.

Another example of active attack is "drive-by spamming" which is a variation of drive-by
hacking in which the attacker gains access to an unsecured WLAN and uses that access to
send huge volumes of spam. Using the drive-by method allows spammers to save
themselves the considerable bandwidth costs required to send many messages
legitimately, and makes it very difficult for anyone to trace the spam back to its source. A
drive-by spamming incident starts with war driving: driving around seeking unsecure
networks, using a computer equipped with a wireless Ethernet card and some kind of an
antenna. A wireless LAN's range often extends beyond the building housing it, and the
network may broadcast identifying information that makes access simple. Once the
attacker finds an unprotected e-mail (SMTP) port (port no 25), the attacker can send email as easily as someone inside the building. To the mail server, the messages appear to
have come from an authorized network user. In this way a spammer or attacker sends out
tens or hundreds of thousands of spam messages using a compromised wireless network.

(3) Man-in-the middle attacks:
Placing a rogue AP (Access Point) within range of wireless stations is wireless-specific
variation of a man-in-the-middle attack. If the attacker knows the SSID in use by the
network (which is easily discoverable) and the rogue AP has enough strength, wireless
users will have no way of knowing that they are connecting to an unauthorized AP.
Using a rogue AP, an attacker can gain valuable information about the wireless network,
such as authentication requests, the secret key that may be in use, and so on. Often, the
attacker will set up a laptop with two wireless adaptors, in which one card is used by the
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rogue AP and the other is used to forward requests through a wireless bridge to the
legitimate AP. With a sufficiently strong antenna, the rogue AP does not have to be
located in close proximity to the legitimate AP. So, for example, the attacker can run the
rogue AP from a car or van parked some distance away from the building. However, it is
also common to set up hidden rogue APs (under desks, in closets, etc.) close to and
within the same physical area as the legitimate AP. Because of their undetectable nature,
the only defense against rogue APs is vigilance through frequent site surveys using tools
such as Netstumbler [Sh04] and AiroPeek [Air07b], and physical security.

(4) Jamming attacks:
Jamming is a special kind of DoS attack specific to wireless networks. Jamming occurs
when spurious RF (Radio Frequency) frequencies interfere with the operation of the
wireless network. In some cases, the jamming is not malicious and is caused by the
presence of other devices, such as cordless phones, that operate in the same frequency as
the wireless network. In a case like this, the administrator must devise and implement
policies regarding the use of these devices or choose wireless hardware that uses different
frequencies. Intentional and malicious jamming occurs when an attacker analyzes the
spectrum being used by wireless networks and then transmits a powerful signal to
interfere with communication on the discovered frequencies. Fortunately, this kind of
attack is not very common because of the expense of acquiring hardware capable of
launching jamming attacks. Plus, jamming a network represents a kind of Pyrrhic victory
for the attacker since it leads to a lot of time and effort being expended merely to disable
communications for a while.

1.4.8. Counter Measures to wireless security threats
To prevent the attacks, wireless networks can adopt a variety of techniques. These
techniques can be broadly classified into two categories [LLM+07]:
•

Implementing Encryption and Authentication

•

Developing IDS solution
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In this subsection, we will discuss the current technologies for encryption and
authentication. Some of the current IDS solutions for wireless networks will be discussed
in Section 2.6.
Implementing Encryption and Authentication:
In 1999, a wireless security encryption standard was introduced as WEP (Wired
Equivalent Privacy). This method was introduced as part of the 801.11b standard to
provide secure wireless communication using the RC4 stream cipher system from RSA.
In cryptography, RC4 (also known as ARC4 or ARCFOUR) is the most widely-used
software stream cipher and is used in popular protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) (to protect Internet traffic) and WEP (to secure wireless networks). A symmetric
encryption scheme is used in WEP, where a shared key is used for both encryption and
decryption. It was, however, quickly breached and anyone intercepting and monitoring
the wireless traffic could easily break the encryption using a brute force attack with tools
such as Airsnort and WEPCrack [Hu04].

The next technique that was introduced to strengthen the WEP standard was WPA (Wi-Fi
Protected Access) in 2003. This technique is supported in the more recent 802.11a and
802.1 lg networks. It uses Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) as an improved
approach to key encryption by mixing the keys [Hu04]. According to [Wiki07], "Data is
encrypted using the RC4 stream cipher, with a 128-bit key and a 48-bit initialization
vector (IV). One major improvement in WPA over WEP is Temporal Key Integrity
Protocol (TKIP), which dynamically changes keys as the system is used. When combined
with the much larger IV (Initial Vector), this defeats the well-known key recovery attacks
on WEP".
Authentication means that only authorized users can access a network. Authentication
solutions include the use of usernames and passwords, smart cards, biometrics, PKI or a
combination of solutions like smart card with PKI [Li06]. In cryptography, a public key
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infrastructure (PKI) is an arrangement that binds public keys with respective user
identities by means of a certificate authority (CA).
Security based on cryptography can offer data confidentiality, validity, integrity and
authentication. However, some cryptography schemes can be breakable and hence it is
not a full proof scheme for intrusion detection. In addition, even if cryptographic designs
are not challengeable mathematically, cryptosystems that implement the design may be
vulnerable to attack due to software bugs [LLM+07].
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2.

RELATED WORKS

2.1. Data Mining Approaches

for NIDS:

2.1.1. Association Rule:
An association rule is mainly a mathematical rule of the form {A/}-> {By} which is found
useful in data mining based NIDS.

In the database, the association between data items (e.g., A,-, B7) means that we can infer
that particular data item (e.g., Bj) is in existence because of the appearance of some data
items (e.g., A,) in a transaction.

Association rule mining is used to discover correlation relationships among items in a
transaction data. An example of transaction data from a bookstore is shown in table 1.
Transaction ID (TID)

Items

1

book, paper, pencil

2

file, pen, pencil

3

file, paper, pen, pencil

4

file, pen
Table 1: Sample Transaction data

Let us discuss the association rule in a mathematical form. Here are some standard
definitions of association rule related terms from [Du03]:
Given a set of items I - {I/, I2,

, Imj and a database of transactions D = {ti, t2,

, t„j

where U = {In, I 12, —•, hk} and Iy e I, an association rule is an implication of the form X
-> Y where X.YcI

are sets of items called itemsets and X n Y = 0.
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The support for an association rule X -> Y is the percentage of transactions in the
database that contain X u Y. The support parameter can be used to determine how often
the rule is applied.
The confidence or strength for an association rule X -> Y is the ratio of the number of
transactions that contain X u Y to the number of transactions that contain X. The
confidence parameter can be used to determine how often the rule is correct.
For example, using table 1, the itemset / = {book, file, paper, pen, pencil}. We can find
that {file, pen} occurs in transaction 2, 3 and 4. So, if we make a rule like file ->pen, the
support of this rule will be 3/4*100% = 75%, which means 75% of all customers buy
both items.
The confidence of the rule file -^ pen will be the ratio of the number of transactions that
contain {file, pen} to the number of transactions that contain {file}. Transaction number
2, 3 and 4 contain {file, pen} and transaction number 2, 3 and 4 contain {file}. So,
confidence of this rule would be 3/3*100% = 100%, that means 100% of customers who
buy file also buy pen, meaning the rule has 100% accuracy.
Through next several sub-sections we will discuss two important Association Rule
Mining algorithms: Apriori, FP-growth algorithm and frequent episode rules, which are
commonly used for Network Intrusion Detection Systems.

2.1.2. Classification Rule:
Intrusion detection can be thought of as a classification problem: we wish to classify each
audit record into one of a discrete set of possible categories, normal or a particular kind of
intrusion.
Given a set of records, where one of the features is the class label (i.e., the concept),
classification algorithms can compute a model that uses the most discriminating feature
22
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values to describe each concept. For example, consider the telnet connection records
shown in Figure 6. Here, hot is the count of accesses to system directories, creation and
execution of programs, etc, compromised is the count of file/path "not found" errors, and
"Jump to" instructions, etc. RIPPER (a standard rule based machine learning algorithm
developed at ATT research) [LSOO], a classification rule learning program, generates
rules for classifying the telnet connections and some of the rules are displayed in figure 7.
label
normal
normal
guess
normal
overflow
normal
auess
overflow
normal

service
telnet
telnet
telnet
telnet
telnet
telnet
telnet
telnet
telnet

flag
SF

hot
0

f<uled_iogiiis
0

SF
SF
SF
SF
SF
SF
SF
SF

0
0
0
3
0
0
3
0

0
6
0
G
0
5
0
0

compromised
0

. .o
0
0
2
0
0
2
0

root-shell
0
3
0
0
1
0
0
I
0

su
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

duration
10.2
2.1

26.2
126.2
92.5
2.1

13.9
92.5
124S

Figure 6: Telnet Records

RIPPER rule
guess :- failedJosins >= 5.
overflow :- hot = 3. compromised =
root-shell = 1.

Meaning
If number offelledlogins is greater than 5, then this telnet connection is "guess", a guessing password attack.
If die number of hot indicators is 3 „ the number of compromised
conditions is 2, and a root shell is obtained, then this telnet connection is a buffer overflow attack.
If none of the above, then this connection is "normal".

normal:- true.

Figure 7: Example RIPPER Rules from Telnet Records

Here, we see that RIPPER indeed selects unique feature values in identifying intrusions.
These rules can be first inspected and edited by security experts, and then incorporated
into misuse detection systems.
The accuracy of a classification model depends directly on the set of features provided in
the training data. For example, if the features hot, compromised and root shell were
removed from the records in figure 7, RIPPER would not be able to produce accurate

rules to identify buffer overflow connections. Thus, selecting the right set of system
features is a critical step when formulating the decision tree classification tasks [LSM99]
[LS98].
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Now let's use a generalized practical example.
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Table 2: Training data set for classification rule learning.

Suppose we have two classes: Play and Don't Play. We want to observe other attributes
and want to conclude our decision among these two classes. At first, we take the class
Play. Then we relate it with the first attribute "outlook". "Outlook" can have three values
which are "sunny", "overcast" and "rain". From the dataset we can see that if the outlook
is overcast then it is always "play", so we can make it as non-expandable leaf, as there is
no chance that this condition will be violated. Then if the outlook is "sunny" then we can
see that "play" occurs two times and "don't play" occurs three times, so we make "don't
play" as expandable leaf. At last when outlook is "rain" we see from the dataset that
"don't play" occurs two times and "play" occurs three times, so we make "play as
expandable leaf. Then we look at another attribute "humidity". We can see that when the
outlook is sunny, "don't play" occurs 3 times and all those times "humidity" is greater
than 75% (90%, 85%, 95%) and two times when "play" occurs "humidity" is less than
75% (70%, 70%). So when the humidity is less than 75% we make "play" as non24
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expandable leaf and when "humidity" is greater than 75% we make "don't play" as nonexpandable leaf. This is how we classify each condition into a class until it becomes a
non-expandable leaf. The steps and demonstration of this rule is as follows:
\^^J

non-leaf node
|

|l

Expandable leaf

11 non-expandable leaf

C Outlook

j>

Play

(True

Don't Play

(a)Initial Classification
Tree

(b)Intermediate Classification
Tree

Don't Play

(c) Final Classification Tree

Figure 8: Demonstration of classification rule (Hunt's method)

2.1.3. Clustering:
Clustering is a major data mining technique which is widely used in network intrusion
detection purposes. Clustering is a process of partitioning a set of data or objects into
groups of similar objects. Each group, called cluster, consists of objects that are similar
among themselves and dissimilar to objects of other groups.
Traditionally, clustering techniques are broadly divided in hierarchical and partitioning
[Be03]. Hierarchical clustering is further subdivided into agglomerative and divisive.
While hierarchical algorithms build clusters gradually (as crystals are grown),
partitioning algorithms learn clusters directly. In doing so, they either try to discover
clusters by iteratively relocating points between subsets, or try to identify clusters as
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areas highly populated with data [Be03]. In this section we will discuss a popular
clustering algorithm, K-means clustering, which falls under partitioning clustering
method.

K-Means Clustering:
The K-means algorithm takes the input parameter, k, and partitions a set of n objects into
k clusters so that the resulting intra-cluster (objects within the same cluster) similarity is
high but the inter-cluster similarity (objects residing in different clusters) is low. Cluster
similarity is measured with regards to the mean value of the objects in a cluster, which
can be viewed as the cluster's center of gravity.
Algorithm: £-means. Theft-meansalgorithm for partitioning based on the mean value of the
objects in the cluster.
Input: The number of clusters k and a database containing n objects.
Output: A set of k clusters that minimizes the squared-error criterion.
Method:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

arbitrary choose k objects as the initial cluster centers;
repeat
(re)assign each object to the cluster to which the object is the most similar,
based on the mean value of the objects in the cluster;
update the cluster means, i.e., calculate the mean value of the objects for
each cluster;
until no changes;
Figure 9: K-Means algorithm

26

WiFi Miner: An Online Apriori and Sensor Based Wireless Network Intrusion Detection System

produced by this operation will most probably be a false alarm and can be ignored. To
find such sequence they have applied a Frequent Episode Rules algorithm, which is a
data mining algorithm [CGOO]. These algorithms were implemented and tested over
wired network intrusion and were not tested for Wi-Fi intrusions. However, the concept
of these algorithms can be used for Wi-Fi intrusions, but these algorithms need to be
rewritten to be suitable for Wi-Fi intrusions.

2.2.5. Review of Data Mining based NIDS and Why Association Rule
Mining:
Various data mining techniques have been applied to intrusion detection because they
have the advantage of discovering useful knowledge that describes user's or program's
behavior from large audit data sets. Data mining has been applied in two ways in NIDS.
One is at TCPDUMP level, which is experimented more frequently and has been
developed and improved by many researchers. Second way is at alarm level. Their main
goal was to reduce false alarm rate. In normal basic data mining based NIDS we can see
that, network traffic data are coming from various sensors. For pre-processing those raw
binary data we have used BSM/ BAM/ NFR [LSC+Ola]. After preprocessing those data
we get those data in a formatted manner with sourcelP, destinationIP, sourcePort etc.
Then we have a classifier, where we apply data mining techniques (association rule,
classification rule, frequent episode rule, clustering etc.) to train the classifier with huge
amount of previously known normal data; so that it can dig out all correlation among the
normal datasets and specify them as normal. Then, this trained classifier is placed into
real environment and any incoming dataset is compared with those normal datasets in our
database. If there is certain deviation we generate a flag. At the same time we keep the
training process of classifier on, so that it will be capable of detecting more new attacks.

Why Association Rule based NIDS:
In this thesis we have chosen Association Rule based mining for NIDS because it is a
straight forward algorithm to implement and very easy to understand. The only limitation
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of this approach is scalability: when the dataset becomes huge, the mining process
becomes slower as it needs to generate more rules. But we have overcome this problem
by introducing an Online Apriori like algorithm, where it uses a faster approach for
joining, called Smart Join instead of normal Join method, which is the most costly
approach in Apriori algorithm. Moreover, our Association Rule based algorithm does not
generate frequent rules, which reduces its cost greatly and also eliminates the need for
training data. Instead of generating frequent rules and later comparing them with
incoming data to find infrequent patterns, it points out the infrequent patterns or
anomalies on the fly like clustering methods. The question arises why we did not chose
clustering method then. In clustering approaches dealing with large number of
dimensions can be problematic because of time complexity and the effectiveness of the
method depends on the definition of distance. It is also very critical to determine the
cluster borders in clustering approaches. On the other hand for Classification, the
accuracy of a classification model depends directly on the set of features provided in the
training data and selecting the right set of system features is a critical step when
formulating the classification tasks. If the feature set is not chosen correctly, then the
result of classification will be totally wrong. So, we have found the Association Rule
based mining technique the best and safest one to implement for Network Intrusion
Detection environment. In next several sections we will review some important
algorithms (Apriori, FP Growth and Frequent Episode) of Association mining technique
and some NIDS models based on Association rule mining concept.

2.3. Association Rules Mining:
2.3.1. Apriori Algorithm
The Apriori algorithm was first proposed in [ISA93]. The Apriori algorithm only extracts
the frequent patterns from a large dataset with a given support.
Let us discuss an example of how to derive association rules using Apriori algorithm. For
example, in a set of book store transactions, the following records were found:
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Transaction No

Items Purchased

1

Book, Pencil

2

Book, Pencil, Paper, Magazine

3

Book, Paper, Magazine
Table 3: Sample library transactions

A standard algorithm for association rule mining is the Apriori algorithm [ISA93], which
works as follows. Suppose a user specifies minSupport is 2. First we will collect the
transactional database items and create an itemset Candidate 1 (CO, then we will
eliminate all of them from C\ which do not have support greater than or equal to the
minSupport. We will call the second one as frequent patterns with one element in their
set, Li. After creating Li we need to create C2. To create C2 we will join L] with itself
(Apriori-gen way), and will eliminate all itemsets which do not have at least minSupport.
We will continue this process until we get a candidate set Cn or Ln empty. After that we
will create a large itemset which will be the union of all L (i.e. L=Li U L2 U

). Now

let's see the process with sample data. From the sample table given above, we compute
the support of each itemset by scanning the database table to find that for example
Book: 3 meaning that Book has support of 3.

Ci = {Book:3, Pencil:2, Paper:2, Magazine:2}
L] = {Book, Pencil, Paper, Magazine}, Since all have support >= minSupport 2 in the
database.
Joining Li with Li (Apriori join way) gives C2 and scanning the database table gives the
appended supports:
C2 = {(Book, Pencil):2, (Book, Paper):2, (Book, Magazine):2,
(Pencil, Paper) :1, (Pencil, Magazine) :1,
(Paper, Magazine) :2}
Support of (Book ^Pencil): 2. 4 (OK)
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(Book -» Paper): 2. V (OK)
Support of (Book -> Magazine): 2. V (OK)
(Pencil -> Paper): 1 < 2. X (Need to eliminate)
(Pencil -> Magazine): 1 < 2. X (Need to eliminate)
(Paper -» Magazine): 2. V (OK)
So, L2 = {(Book, Pencil), (Book, Paper), (Book, Magazine), (Paper, Magazine)}
In the same way,
C3 = {(Book, Pencil, Paper):l, (Book, Pencil, Magazine):l, (Book, Paper, Magazine):2}
Among itemsets in C3, only (Book, Paper, Magazine) has support up to minSupport.
So, L3 = {(Book, Paper, Magazine)}
ThenC 4 ={}
L = L,UL2UL3
= {Book, Pencil, Paper, Magazine,
(Book, Pencil), (Book, Paper), (Book, Magazine), (Paper, Magazine)
(Book, Paper, Magazine)}.
Here L defines all frequent or large pattern from which association rules are generated.
From every frequent pattern, e.g., (Book, Paper, Magazine) rules are generated from all
of its itemsets and only rules with confidence greater than or equal to the minimum
confidence provided by the user are retained, while the rest are pruned. Rules from the
frequent pattern (Book, Paper, Magazine)

are (Book, Paper) -> Magazine, (Book,

Magazine) -> Paper, (Paper, Magazine) -> Book and the confidence of the rule (Paper,
Magazine) -> Book from the database table is the cardinality of the rule divided by the
cardinality of the antecedent equals 2/3 or 75%. Thus, this rule is retained if the
minimum confidence is 50%.
Generally, in data-mining based NIDS we create a database of non-intrusive events and
then apply association rule technique into that dataset to find out all other rules or events
when there will be no intrusions. This will find all hidden normal behavior. Then, these
rules will be compared with any incoming data itemsets to determine if it is an intrusion
or not. The most critical factor here is that we have to set a minimum threshold for
39

WiFi Miner: An Online Apriori and Sensor Based Wireless Network Intrusion Detection System

minimum support and confidence level. Later when discussing the algorithms, we will
see it in details.
2.3.2. FP-Growth Algorithm:
In [HPY+04], authors have presented a novel method called "FP-Growth", which mines
the complete set of frequent itemset without candidate generation. The FP-growth
algorithm transforms the problem of finding long frequent patterns to looking for shorter
ones recursively and then concatenating the suffix [HPY+04]. The main strength of this
algorithm is that it needs to scan the database only twice to mine the FP-tree and later
from this FP-tree frequent patterns can be found easily. The main limitation of this
approach is that it needs to build the conditional pattern base and conditional FP-tree
recursively, which needs a lot of memory [EDA08].

Let us use the sample database given below in Table 3 to describe the algorithm:
TID Items
100 A C D
200

BCE

300

ABCE

400

BE

Table 4: Sample database

Step 1: The algorithm will scan the full database and will extract the frequent 1-itemsets
and their support counts and sort the list of frequent 1-items in the descending order.
Suppose the minimum support is 2. So, item D will be deleted as it has support count 1,
which is less than minimum support. So, the ordered list will be: L = {B:3, C:3, E:3,
A:2}. So, now the ordered frequent 1-itemsets will be as follows:
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TID Ordered Frequent Items
100

CA

200

BCE

300

BCEA

400

BE

Table 5: Ordered Frequent Itemsets
Step 2: Now the algorithm starts constructing FP-tree. First it creates the root of the tree
as "null". Then, it scans the database for the second time and items in each transaction are
processed in L order and for each transaction a branch is created. For example, the first
transaction "T100: C A" will create the first branch with two nodes. The second
transaction "T200: B C E" will construct a different branch with three nodes. The third
transaction "T300: B C E A " has a common prefix of "B C E" with T200, so it will
follow that branch of T200 and will increase the count of B, C and E to 2 and will add a
new node for "A". The fourth transaction "T400: B E" has a common prefix of "B" with
T200, so it will increase the count of "B" to 3 and will add a new node for "E" at a
different branch. Moreover, for easily traversing the tree, an item header table is built so
that each item points to its occurrences in the tree via a chain of node-links. The FP-tree
will look like the following Figure 13:

Support count
Nod***

•

8
C
E
A

3
3
3
2

i

Figure 13: FP-tree
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Step 3: Now the algorithm starts to mine the FP-tree. At first consider node "A", which is
the last node in the ordered list "L" and in the tree. Consider "A" as a suffix and its two
prefix paths are {C: 1} and {E C B: 1}, which form its conditional pattern base. Its
conditional FP-tree contains no node because none of the items in the conditional pattern
base can reach the minimum support count of 2. Next for "E", the conditional patterns
base is {B C: 2} and {B: 1}. Its conditional FP-tree contains only one branch <B: 3,
C:2>. This branch generates frequent patterns: {B C E: 2}, {B E: 3} and {C E: 2}. For
node "C", the conditional patterns base is {B: 2}, which has the minimum support count.
So, its conditional FP-tree is <B:2> and frequent patterns from here is {B C:2}. Finally,
for node "B", there is no conditional pattern base and so, no conditional FP-tree and
frequent items.
Item Conditional pattern base Conditional FP-tree Frequent patterns
A

{(C:1),(ECB:1)}

Null

A

E

{(BC:2),(B:1)}

<B:3, C:2>

B C E:2, B E:3, C E:2, E

C

{(B:2)}

<B:2>

B C:2, C

B

None

Null

B

Table 6: Frequent patterns from FP-tree mining

So, this is how FP-growth algorithm generates the list of frequent patterns: {{B}, {C},
{E}, {A}, {B,E}, {C,E}, {B,C} and {B,C,E}}.

2.3.3. Frequent Episode Rule:
An episode is a set of sequential transactions in a given period. Briefly, given an event
database D, where each transaction is associated with a time stamp, an interval [tj,t2] is
the sequence of transactions that start from ti and ends at t2- The width of interval, w is
defined as t2-ti. Given an itemset A in D, an interval is a minimum occurrence of A if it
contains A and none of its proper sub-intervals contain A. Define snpport(X) as the ratio
between the number of minimum occurrences that contain X and the total number of
event numbers in database D. A frequent episode rule is the expression: X,Y •> Z,
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[confidence, support, window]. Here X, Y and Z are item sets, and they together form an
episode, s is the support of the rule support(X U Y U Z) and c is the confidence of the
rule, c = support(X U Y U Z) I support(X U Y). The width of each of the occurrences
must be less than window (w). When minimum confidence, minimum support and time
window are known, this algorithm for episode rules can compute all frequent episode
rules [MT96] [LSM99a] [LXY03].
In NIDS it is sometimes very important because some events occur with other events and
this is a normal behavior if it occurs within a certain time period. After finding all
frequent episodes we can say them as innocent. Since normal behavior occurs more
frequently than an abnormal behavior, a frequent behavior will never be an intrusion. As
an example, let us consider the SYN flood attack. When launching this attack, an attacker
uses many spoofed source addresses to open many connections which never become
completely established (i.e. only the first SYN packet is sent, and the connection remains
in So state) to some port on a victim host (e.g., http) [LSC+Ola]. Figure 14 [LSM99a]
[LSM99b] shows such frequent episodes rule and also explains it.
Frequent Episode

Meaning

(service = http, flag = So, dst_host = 93%of the time, after two http connections
victim), (service = http, flag = So, dsthost with So flag are made to host victim, within
= victim) -> (service = http, flag = So, 2 seconds from the first of these two, the
dsthost = victim) [0.93, 0.03, 2]

third similar connection is made, and this
pattern occurs in 3% of the data

Figure 14: Frequent Episodes Rule (SYN flood attack)

2.4. Data Mining based NIDS Projects using Association Rule
Mining
Data mining techniques especially Association rule mining was able to get a lot of
attention from many researchers from early 2000 in the field of Network Intrusion
detection. Some famous projects that implement Association rule mining include ADAM
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[BCJ+01], MADAMID [LSOO], MINDS [ELK+04], LERAD [MC03] etc. In next few
sub-sections we will discuss these algorithms in details.

2.4.1. ADAM
ADAM [BCJ+01] was one of the most important research in this field at the time of 2001
and 2002. A lot of research have been done on improvement of this algorithm later on.
ADAM uses a combination of association rules and classification to detect any attack in a
TCP Dump audit trails. First, ADAM collects normal, known frequent datasets by mining
into this model. Secondly, it runs an on-line algorithm to find last frequent connections
and compare them with the known mined data and discards those which seem to be
normal. With the suspicious ones it then uses a classifier which is previously trained to
classify the suspicious connections as a known type of attack, unknown type of attack or
a false alarm.
There are two phases in this experimental model. In the first phase they trained the
classifier. This phase takes place only once offline before using the system. In the second
phase they use the trained classifier to detect intrusions. The algorithm with example is
described below.
Phase 1:
•

In the first phase, attack free normal frequent datasets are used to build a normal
profile, where a minimum support is specified. For example, we have a database
consists of attack free connections. The schema of the database is shown in Table
7.

Time stamp Source IP Source Port Destination IP Destination port Flag Service
Table 7: Schema of attack free database to be used to build attack free normal profile

•

Now suppose for some specified minimum support (for instance 60%) we collect
only those connections those have a support greater than the minimum support.
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And we build a profile of normal connections. For example, the normal profile
might be like table 7.
Time

Source IP

stamp

Source

Destination

Destination

Port

IP

port

Flag

Service

TO

137.207.34.1 80

168.212.22.3

80

ACK http

Tl

137.207.34.1 25

207.34.56.2

25

ACK telnet

Table 8: Sample of normal profile

•

Then in the second step again training data and the already built normal profile
are used with an online algorithm of tunable size. From the training data,
association rules are generated in the form of X-^ Y. Suppose, in some specified
period of time a rule (srcJP = 137.207.34.1, srcjort = 80 -> service = http) is
getting strong support. Then this rule will be checked in the normal profile, if the
rule is present then it will be ignored. In this case it will be ignored since it
matches with the normal profile. But for instance, if we see that a rule {destIP =
137.207.34.1, destjport = 80 -> flag = SYN) (which is actually a signature of
SYN flood attack) is getting strong support within a specified time window and
this does not match with any normal profile data, a counter is used to track the
support that the itemset received. If the support crosses the threshold, then it will
be reported as suspicious.

Then the features of the raw data corresponding to these suspicious itemsets are located
and used to train the classifier by classifying them as false alarms or attacks.
Phase 2:
•

In this phase, the classifier is already trained and can categorize any attack as
known or false alarm. The attacks that are not specified in the classifier are
labeled as unknown attacks. Here, also the same dynamic on-line algorithm is
used to produce suspicious data with the help of normal profile and trained
classifier. If it is false alarm then the classifier excludes those from the attack list
and does not send those to system monitoring officer.
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The main deficiency in the approach is that they used only association rules and as a
result their classifier generated a lot of rules, among them many were redundant. They do
not have any mechanism to avoid those redundant and irrelevant rules. For example,
suppose a rule is (A,B) -> C, which means that if A and B occurs then C will occur. It
already confirms that ifB occurs then C will occur. But this algorithm will compute B ->
C also as a different rule, which means that this algorithm generates unnecessary extra
rules. But later, a lot of studies have been done on this approach and many researchers
introduced various measures (like interestingness, I) [MC03] [LSF+00] into their
consideration and improved this model. Such a model is described in detail in section
2.4.3. Another weakness of ADAM is that it totally depends on attack free normal
training data, which are difficult to get.

2.4.2. MADAM ID
MAD AMID is one of the well known IDSs in this field. In this paper [LSOO] their aim
was to develop a more systematic and automated approach for building IDS. They have
developed a set of tools that can be applied to a variety of audit data [section 2.1.2]
sources to generate intrusion detection models. The central theme of MAD AMID
approach is to apply data mining programs to the extensively gathered audit data to
compute models that accurately capture the actual behavior or patterns of intrusions and
normal activities. The main components of MADAMID framework include learning
classifiers and meta-classifiers [Section 2.1.3], association rules [Section 2.2.1] for data
analysis and frequent episodes [section 2.3.3] for sequence analysis. The process of
applying MADAMID is as follows:

In the first step, raw audit data are gathered in binary format. Then, they are processed
into ASCII network packet information. For example, initially they Were some bytes in 0
and 1. Then, we convert those values to ASCII format, so that we can easily understand
them. Suppose first 16 bit number indicates the source port number, so we convert the
first 16 bit binary number into hex or decimal so that we can understand the source port
number. After decoding all packet header information we then summarize them into
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connection records containing some basic features like service, duration etc. The sample
connection records after converting into ASCII will look like Table 8.

Timestamp Duration Service src_hast

dst_ho6t

src_bytes ctat_byfce»

Flag

victim

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

SO
SO

300
300
12100
300
0

SF
SF
SF
SF
REJ

1,1
1,1
1.1
1,1
1,1
1,1
1,1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

http
http
http
http
http
http
http

' spoofed_.l
spoofed_2
spoofed_3
spoofed_4
Kpoofed_5
,«pijofed_6
spoofed_7

victim
victim
victim
victim
victim

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

10,1
.12.3
13.4
13.7
15,2

2
1
60
1
1

ftp
smtp
telnet
sratp
http

A
B
A
B
D

B
D
D
C
A

200
250
200
200
200

victim

so
so
so
so
so

Table 9: Sample Network Connection Records

Various data mining programs like association rule, frequent episode rule are then applied
to those connection records and as an output they got some derived features and then
these derived features are used as rules in models. For example, suppose in connection
records we have got that from the same source IP many packets are trying to access to
many destination IPs but with same port. In packets/ event records step all these
information were discrete and they are brought together on the basis of a certain time
window (which was 5 minutes in their experiments) in the connection/ session records
step. For example, after applying frequent episode rule [section 2.3.3] into data of Table
8, we get the output like Table 9.

Frequent Episode

Meaning

(service = http, flag = So, dsthost = 93%of the time, after two http connections
victim), (service = http, flag = So, dsthost with So flag are made to host victim, within
= victim) -> (service = http, flag = So, 2 seconds from the first of these two, the
third similar connection is made, and this
dsthost = victim) [0.93, 0.03, 2]
pattern occurs in 3% of the data
Table 10: Example output of intrusion pattern from Table 8
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Then, after applying data mining rules (association/ frequent episodes) in these records
we come to know a feature that if above condition happens then, this might be an
anomaly or attack and we get a rule describing this situation from this step. Then, at last
this rule is applied into the model. Since all these data mining methods (association rule,
frequent episode rule) are described with example in section 2.2.1 and 2.3.3 accordingly
and feature construction is described in 2.1.3., they are not discussed here again.
Currently, MADAM ID produces misuse detection models for network and host systems
as well as anomaly detection models for users. The main strength in their approach is that
they have focused on efficiency and automated the process of feature constructions. Their
limitation is that their system is currently off-line and they are studying how to convert it
into real time IDS because effective intrusion detection system should be real time system
to minimize the security compromise. Another limitation in this model is that it computes
only the frequent patterns of connection records. But many intrusions like those that
embed all activities within a single connection do not have frequent patterns in
connection data. These types of intrusions might go undetected in their model.

2.4.3. LERAD
This research [MC03] presented an efficient algorithm called LERAD (Learning Rules
for Anomaly Detection). They presented it as an alternative to ADAM [BCJ+01]
algorithm. The main difference between ADAM algorithm and LERAD algorithm is that
ADAM produces all possible association rules and relations and as a result the rate of
false alarm is also very high. On the other hand LERAD produces fewer selected rules,
which are free of redundancy and the false alarm rate is also lower than in ADAM
algorithm. For example, suppose a rule is (A,B) -> C, which means that if A and B
occurs then C will occur. It already confirms that if B occurs then C will occur. But
ADAM will compute B - ^ C a s a different rule while LERAD will remove this rule as
redundant.
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In LERAD, at first, it selects a consequent. Then it starts adding antecedents to create
new rules. Finally, it removes rules where rule's antecedent is part of another rule's
antecedent. For example, we select C as consequent. Then we create a rule, A -> C. Next,
we add another antecedent B to the rule and it becomes (A,B) -> C. In the second phase
of LERAD, we see that (A,B) -> C has already marked the antecedent (A) of the rule A
-> C, so we remove it.

The algorithm and how it produces fewer rules are described with example below.

Suppose S is the sample of training data sets in Table 10.

Port
80
80
25

Wordl
GET
GET
HcLO

Word2
i

/index.htrnl
pascal

Word3
HTTP/1.0HTTP/1,0

Table 11: Sample Training Dataset
Here Port, Wordl, Word2 and Word3 are four attributes.

Step 1: In this step it generates all possible rules and relations from the sample. The
algorithm is as follows:

Repeat L times
Randomly pick two instances S} and S2 from S
Set .4 = {a: Sj[<,'] = S2[a] ] (matching attributes)
For m = 1 to M and A not empty do
Randomly remove a from .4
If m = 1 then create rule n, = "a = SifoJ"
Else add Si[a] = a to rfs antecedent.
Add r.j to rule set R
Figure 15: LERAD Algorithm (|MC03] page: 602)
In the first line of the algorithm in figure 12, we randomly pick two instances Sj and S2
from sample S. So, Sj = {80, GET, /, HTTP/1.0} and
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S2 = {80, GET, /index.html, HTTP/1.0}
Then, we match the attributes of Si and S2 in the second line. The matched attributes are
(Port, Wordl,Word3).
Then, in the third line we start a loop. The loop goes 1 to M. Suppose in this case let
M=4. Now we enter into the loop in the next line. Here, we randomly choose Wordl as a
from the list of attributes A and remove it from A. So now a=Wordl and A={Port,
Word3}. For the first time m=l and we go inside the //"statement and create a rule r\:
Wordl=GET. We add this rule to the ruleset.
The second time m=2 and attribute set "A" is not empty. So again we go inside the loop.
This time we randomly remove another attribute "Port" as "a". So now, a=Port,
A={Word3}. This time we go to the else part as m is not equal to 1. Si [Port] = 80 and we
add this as antecedent of rule2 r2. So,
r2: if Port = 80 then Wordl = GET. We add this to the ruleset.
Third time still m < 4 and A is not empty. We randomly choose the only one attribute left
Word3 and remove it from A. Now a=Word3 and A={ }. Then, we go to the else part.
S,[Word3] = HTTP/1.0. We add this as antecedent of r3. r3: if Port = 80 and Word3 =
HTTP/1.0 then Wordl = GET. We add this to the ruleset.
Fourth time m=4 and also A is empty. So we break the loop. This is how the algorithm
generates rules and the whole process continues until generation of all rules. So finally in
this step our ruleset is:
R={
r\: Wordl = GET,
r2: if Port = 80 then Wordl = GET
r 3 : if Port = 80 and Word3 = HTTP/1.0 then Wordl = GET
}
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Step 2: In this step we order those rules in decreasing order and remove any redundant
rules. To sort these rules, we use a score of n/r, where n is the number of training
instances satisfying the antecedent and r is the number of allowed value. The algorithm is
as followed in figure 16:
Update the consequents in R over S
Sort R by decreasing n/r
For each rale Rj in R in decreasing order of r/n
Mark the values predicted by R-,
If no new values can be marked, remove /?,Figure 16: LERAD algorithm (Part 2)

For example, in our case, after training over S and sorting by n/r these become:
•

r2: if Port = 80 then Word 1= GET (n/r = 2/1)

•

r3: if Port = 80 and Word3 = HTTP/1.0 then Wordl = GET (n/r = 2/1)

•

ri: Word 1 = GET or HELO (n/r = 3/2)

As an explanation let's see how n and r are selected of r3. Number of instances where
wordl = GET or HELO is 3 and the allowed values are both of them which is 2. Let's see
another example. For r2, the number of instances where the rule is matched is 2 (1 st and
2nd rows of table) and the allowed value here is only GET, so r = 1. Here the arbitrary
value of r2 and r3 as same and anyone could be on the 1st place.

Removing redundant rule: r2 marks the two GET values in S. Rule r3 would mark the
same two values and no new values, so we remove it. Rule ri marks the HELO in the
third instance in addition to the previously marked values, so we keep this rule.

2.4.4. MINDS
MINDS is one of the most popular NIDS in current days. This system [ELK+04] was
developed at department of computer science in University of Minnesota. University of
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Minnesota is using this system in their network from 2002 and they are capable of
detecting many new attacks as they are launched (examples include "slammer worm",
"NetBus worm" etc).
There are two kinds of anomaly detection techniques, which are supervised and
unsupervised anomaly detection. In supervised anomaly detection, given a set of normal
data to train on and given a new set of test data and the goal is to determine if the test data
is normal or anomalous. In unsupervised anomaly detection system the model attempts to
detect anomalous behavior without using any knowledge about the training data.
Unsupervised anomaly detection systems are based on statistical approaches, clustering,
outlier detection schemes etc. This MINDS [ELK+04] is a kind of unsupervised anomaly
detection system.
MINDS uses a suite of data mining techniques to automatically detect attacks against
computer networks and systems. The long term objective of MINDS is to address all
aspects of intrusion detection. In this paper they have presented details of two specific
contributions: (1) an unsupervised anomaly detection technique that assigns a score to
each network connection that reflects how anomalous the connection is, and (2) an
association pattern analysis based module that summarizes those network connections
that are ranked highly anomalous by the anomaly detection module.
The workflow of the MINDS is described below in the figure 17. We will describe the
system with the workflow step by step.
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The MINDS System

Summary of
anomalies

Acaivn

-Ati
id knows

db

Figure 17: MINDS System

Input:
Input to the MINDS is Netflow version 5 data collected using flow tool [FT07] which is
an alternative to tcpDump data. Flow-tools only capture packet header information, not
the message contents. Just like top dump data header information contains source ip,
source port, destination ip, destination port, time stump, flag values, duration of the
connection etc. They have used 10 minutes time window. All data in the internet are
passed as packets. All these packets have some header information and data. The system
only captures the header information for all of those packets that have passed in last 10
minutes. Those data are stored and before they are fed into the main system a data
filtering step is performed to remove network traffic that the analyst is not interested in
analyzing. For example, filtered data may include traffic from trusted sources. For
example, in University of Windsor, when an access request to port numbers between
40000 and 60000 comes from UofW campus network it is granted otherwise if the source
IP is not from university network the access is denied. More precisely, if somebody tries
to access port 40001 with http://cs.uwindsor.ca:40001 from home, then the request is
denied but is granted if the request is coming from university lab computers.
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Step 1: Feature Construction
The first step in MINDS main system is "feature extraction". The data are in the binary
format but we know the format (which bytes are representing what) and we extract those
basic features from the audit data. These basic features include source and destination IP
address, source and destination ports, protocol, flags, number of bytes and number of
packets. With these basic features then derived features are computed. There are two
types of derived features, (1) time window based features and (2) connection window
based features. Time window based features are constructed to capture connection with
similar characteristics within last T seconds. For example, how many connections were
destined towards the same destination IP address in last T seconds is called count-dest.
Connection window based features are constructed to capture connection with similar
characteristics within last N connection. For example, within last N connection how
many connections were destined towards the same destination IP address is called countdest-conn. Sample features of both type features are presented below in Table 11 and
table 12.

Feature

Feature Description

name
count-dest

Number of flows to unique destination IP address inside the network in the
last T seconds from the same source

count-src

Number of flows from unique source IP addresses inside the network in
the last T seconds to the same destination

count-servsrc
count-servdest

Number of flows from the source IP to the same destination port in last T
seconds
Number of flows from the destination IP address using same source port in
last T seconds
Table 12: Time-window based features
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Feature name

Feature Description

count-dest-

Number of flows to unique destination IP address inside the network in

conn
count-src-conn

the last N flows from the same source
Number of flows from unique source IP addresses inside the network in
the last N flows to the same destination

count-serv-src- Number of flows from the source IP to the same destination port in last
conn
count-servdest-conn

N flows
Number of flows from the destination IP address using same source
port in last N flows
Table 13: Connection-window based features

Step 2: Known Attack Detection
After all features of connection have been derived then the next step is to compare those
features with known anomalies. If it finds a match then it directly sends it to the analysts.
For example, suppose it is known from time-window based features that one single
source IP is trying to access the same port in many destination IPs many times within the
last 3 seconds and if there is existing signature of this kind of attack then it can be sent to
analyst as an attack without any hesitation. Now if there is no known attack signature of
this kind then we send that connection record to Anomaly Detection module, which will
be the next step.

Step 3: Anomaly Detection
In this step Anomaly Detection module will use an outlier detection algorithm to assign
an anomaly score to each network connection. It assigns a degree of being an outlier to
each data point, which is called Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [BKN+00]. For each data
example, the density of the neighborhood is first computed. The LOF of a specific data
example p represents the average of the ratios of the density of the example p and the
density of its neighbors. LOF requires the neighborhood of all data points be constructed.
This involves calculating pairwise distances between all data points, which is 0(n2)
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complexity. As there will be million data sets, the complexity will be huge. To reduce the
complexity an approach has been taken in MINDS. They have made a sample dataset
from the data and all data points are compared with the small set, which reduces the
complexity to 0(n*m), where m is the size of small dataset.

Figure 18: Local Outlier Factor (LOF) approach

For example, in the figure 18 we can see that cluster C2 is denser than C\. Due to the low
density in cluster C\, for most examples q inside C\, the distance between any dataset and
its neighbor is greater than that of Q . For example, the distance between pi and P3 is
higher than the distance between P2 and P4. So, therefore p2 will not be considered as
outlier.
Step 4: Association Pattern Analysis
After assigning each connection a score then top 10% scores are taken as anomaly class
and bottom 30% scores are taken as normal class. Middle 60% scores are ignored in their
system. Then, these scored connections are passed into the Association Pattern Generator.
This module summarizes network connections that are ranked highly anomalous by the
anomaly detection module. The goal of mining association patterns is to discover patterns
that occur frequently in anomaly class or in normal class. In this step they have applied
association rule [Section 2.1.1.] to construct rulesets for anomaly class and for normal
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class. For example, scanning activity for a particular service can be summarized by a
frequent set:
sourceIP=X, destinationPort=Y
If most of the connections in the frequent set are ranked high by previous step, then this
frequent set may be a candidate signature for addition to a signature-based system. Or, if
the following frequent set is scored lower and appeared many times then we can say it is
normal which is a web browsing activity. The web browsing activity can be summarized
as a frequent rule set:
Protocol=TCP, destinationPort=80, NumPackets=3.. .6
Then, in the last step summary of all rules are presented in front of analyst and then
analyst can update or build normal profile or can label new attack signatures. This is how
the MINDS works as an unsupervised anomaly detection system. One limitation of
MINDS is that it only analyzes the header parts of data and does not pay attention to
pay load, which is the data section of TCP packets. As a result, U2R or R2U attacks may
go undetected in their system.

2.5. Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS)
Wireless Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS) will monitor a WLAN using a mixture of
hardware and software called sensors [Hu04]. WLAN IDSs can be host based, network
based and hybrid. Both host based and network based IDSs are equal from a central
control perspective. WLAN network based IDSs are usually deployed at centralized
administration points (e.g., WAP) to monitor the WLAN network traffic [LLM+07].
Typically, all wired network attacks from network layer and above can be used on
WLANs and therefore most intrusion detection techniques for wired networks can be
applied to WLAN IDSs [LLM+07].

57

WiFi Miner: An Online Apriori and Sensor Based Wireless Network Intrusion Detection System

Rogue WAPs are specific threats to WLAN. In general, rogue (unauthorized) WAP detection follows a two-step process: 1) identify whether it is present, 2) decide whether it
is rogue. Radio frequency (RF) scanning is the most common technique used by WLAN
IDSs to detect rogue WAPs. Once a WAP is discovered, a pre-configured authorized list
of WAPs is used to identify whether it is rogue. Any newly detected WAP that falls
outside the authorized list would be considered rogue [LLM+07].
Currently, there are many open source wireless scanners. These scanners use Radio
Frequency (RF) to detect any new WAP in the vicinity and can monitor their traffic. With
these sensors we can get a picture of the wireless networks around. Examples of these
scanners are Kismet [Hu04], NetStumbler [Sh04], airSnort [Air07c]. Then, this
information can be used to create a WIDS. To understand these network traffic and
extracting alerts from it we need professional security analyst, who can interpret the alerts
and make sense of the output. In misuse WIDS, a list of attack signature is kept to detect
any attack. We have seen that at a pre-configured authorized list of WAPs is also
maintained to detect rouge WAPs. In a similar way, we also need to maintain a list of
authorized MAC addresses to detect any rouge MAC or MAC spoofing. Commercial
WIDSs offer all these features in an integrated single software. The major benefits of
wireless IDS technology that would enhance the defensive posture can be categorized in
two different groups [Me06]:
•

Real-time Network Monitoring and Radio Frequency (RF) Management: Wireless
IDS can monitor network activities (e.g., packets coming into the network,
packets going outside from the network, clients connected etc.) in real-time and
also it can control/ manage to which channel it will broadcast or operate its
network packets or activities.

•

Intrusion Detection and Response: Wireless IDS has the capability to detect
intrusions in wireless environment and can block these suspicious connections or
pass them to analyst for further review.
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These functions can be partly done by wired network IDS, but a wired IDS does not have
Radio Frequency (RF) management function although it can do the real time wired
network monitoring.
Examples of such enterprise software include AirMagnet [Air08a], AirDefense [Air08b],
Red-M [Red08], AirWave [Air08c], BlueSocket [Blu08] etc.

2.6.

Data Mining in WIDS

Wireless Intrusion Detection is a newer area of research and still it is getting a lot of
attention among researchers and industry communities. So far, works on wireless
intrusion detection have focused on improving the architecture or protocol of WLANs
and on detecting specific types of attacks [BS03] [HPJ03] [WZS02]. But more recently
there are some research on how data mining concept can be applied to detect anomalous
traffic in wireless networks including WLAN and ad-hoc networks [ZKN05] [LLM+07].

2.6.1. A Clustering Approach to Wireless Network Intrusion Detection
In this research [ZKN05], authors have analyzed network traffic data streams collected
and recorded from a WLAN system and in detecting all types of attack behaviors through
data mining technique specially clustering technique. The log they have used here is
specifically for wireless traffic and they have extracted these data from several access
points (APs). The metrics they have studied for characterizing wireless network attacks
include Broadcast SSID, Sequence number of AP etc., which cannot be found in normal
wired TCP traffic. In their approach they have clustered wireless traffic data and used
heuristics to label each instance as intrusive or normal. The heuristic is simple, where
clusters are ordered according to the distance to the largest cluster and a percentage cutoff
is used to determine the separation point between attacks and normal clusters. The
assumption they have used is that since normal instances are generally very dominant in
the collected data, the largest cluster is usually composed of normal instances and
anomalous or attack instances would belong to clusters that are far away from the largest
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cluster. In their system, they have used online-k-means algorithm, which is claimed to
outperform the standard k-means algorithm.
The wireless logs they have used for this research are available at http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/mbdazin/wireless/. It corresponds to wireless trace collection from a real network with
more than 170 access points spread over three physical locations (buildings) over a period
of several weeks. The wireless network used for data collection was operating in the
infrastructure mode with clients connected via the access points.
After collecting the raw data from wireless logs, they have preprocessed the data to make
it suitable for clustering algorithm. In this study, they were constrained by the metrics
that were available in the recorded wireless logs rather than having all the metrics that are
theoretically required to model common wireless attacks. The metrics used in the study
are described in table 14:

.Metric
AID
Parent
Day
Timers lot
ShortRet
LoagRet
Quality
Strength
SrcPkts
SrcErrPkts
DstErrPkts
DstMaxRelryErr

Description
The highest, occurring (most occurrences) value will be used for the set, ofrecordsthat arc grouped
if a non-unique value is found. Over alt there will be 4 categories.
A categorical value representing 173 distinct access points. This value will be retained along with
a distinct MAC address pair, it shows connection related activity.
A categorical value in (Weekday, Weekend}.
A categorical value in (Morning, Day, Evening}, to represent the peat and off-peak time periods.
A numeric value averaged across groupings.
A numeric vaine averaged across groupings.
A numeric measure in [0, 100], averaged to give the idea of mean quidity.
Signal strength, a numeric value in [0, 100].
The number of packets a station sourced, which could be averaged to show the transmission activity
level of the station. It can. later be discreiized into low, medium and high.
Number of errors in source packets.
Number of errors in destination packets
Number of observed max-reuy error packets for which this station was the destination.

Table 14: Metrics used to cluster the wireless logs

After preprocessing the data they have applied the online K-means algorithm to find the
clusters from the wireless log data.
We will now explain their online K-mean algorithm with an example. Suppose table 15
represents the input data.
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Site

Momen

Day
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SnmpOutPkt
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lpln

IpOut

IP

Tcpl

TcpOu

F

n

t

Udpln

UdpOu
t

w
d
LBdg
MBdg

2.7.2

00:05:0

0
2.7.2
0

7

AP

3:1:57:12.

7

1

0

00:10:0

AP

3:2:02:12.

2

0

523976

522317

984212

524444

522783

984744

528030

0

1911

1911

523187

524183

528498

0

1911

1911

523653

524649

Table 15: Sample Input data for clustering

We can only use numeric values for Clustering. Therefore the site and AP name attributes
which are of string data type in the sample data have to be converted to numeric data
type. The author's used 1-of-N encoding, which assigns the same weight to each category
and requires as many numeric places as there are categories. For example, Site with 3
nominal values (LBldg, MBldg, SBldg) would be assigned 100, 010, and 001
respectively. LBldgAP and MBldgAP will be assigned 200 and 020 respectively, and
any other APname would be 002.
Suppose our Input dataset has 4 dimensions and the cluster has 2 points L, M, and a
centroid P;
L = (L,, L 2 ,.- , L4),M = (M,, M2, ...., M4), and P = (P,,P2, ... , P4). P, = (L,+M,)/2, P2 =
(L2+M2)/2, P3 = (L3+M3)/2, P4 = (L4+M4)/2.
The cluster centroid is randomly selected, each point in the matrix is assigned to the
nearest cluster center and then a new centroid for each cluster is recalculated using the
new cluster member values. For example, we will use a simple sample dataset for easy
calculation to show how the online K-Means algorithm works. Assuming we transform
the sample input data in Table 14, to make use of only five attributes from the sample
input as shown in Table 16.
Connection Record Attribute 1

Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4

Coni

5

3

2

1

Con2

6

6

3

1

Table 16: Sample connection records for kmo algorithm

Each record Coni, Con2 represents one point with 4 attributes.
61

WiFi Miner: An Online Apriori and Sensor Based Wireless Network Intrusion Detection System

1. Initial value of centroids (Initialization): Let d

and C2 denote randomly selected

centroids, with Ci = (3,3,33) and C2 = (2,2,2,2). We are using a cluster with 2 points,
therefore our K (number of clusters) = 2.
2. Objects-Centroids Distance: The distance between cluster centroid to each object is
calculated using Euclidean distance. Then, distance matrix at iteration 0 will be

(1)

Xn- f^yn

N
Where yn = arg min*

x„ - p.* r is the cluster identity of data vector x„ and [lyn is the

centroid of clustery.

represents LI norm.

Let Li and Mj = Coni, Con2 respectively and since we want to cluster the connection
records in two clusters Ci and C2, as shown in Figure 19 below;
Li
5

M

Ci

6

3

£1
2

3

6

3

2

2

3

3

2

1

1

3

2

Figure 19: Matrix representation of CI and C2 at 0,h iteration

Then the distances between the columns in Table 1 is calculated as follows using
equation 1;
d(Li,C,) = V{(5-3)2 + (3-3)2 + (2-3)2 + ( 1-3)2} = ^9= 3
d (Mj,C,) = V {(6-3)2 + (6-3)2 + (3-3)2 + (1-3)2} =^22= 4.69
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d (L i; C 2 ) = V{(5-2)2 + (3-2)2 + (2-2)2 + ( 1-2)2 }= -y/11 = 3.32

d (Mj,C2) = V {(6-2)2 + (6-2)2 + (3-2)2 + ( 1-2)2 }= V 3 4 = 5.83
Do represents distance at iteration 0, therefore our matrix at iteration 0 for the instance C\
is:
Do = [3

4.69]

3. Objects clustering: The difference between online K-Means and normal K-Means is that,
normal K-Means will assign all instances (connection records) to a cluster and then
update the centroid. But, with online K-Means centroid is updated after assigning each
instance to a cluster. The aim is to move the cluster point closer to the vector instance.
Based on the minimum distance, Coni is assigned to group 1 as shown in Table 17.

1
C

0 =

_0

= group 1
= group 2

Table 17: Object clustering generating cluster (C0)

Ci = (3,3,3,3) group 1
C 2 = (2,2,2,2) group 2
4. Determine a new centroid. It uses equation 2 below to calculate the new centroid
position:
(new)
_
M-yn

Hyn- 5E_ = J^yn + I ( X n- JUyn)

(2)

d|Llyn
S is a learning rate that takes a small positive number (e.g., 0.05) or gradually decreases
in the learning process
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M-yn = 4, I = 0.05. Since there are no objects in group 2, the centroid at group 2 will
remain unchanged at (2, 2, 2, 2). The new centroid Jiyn

(new)

(new center position) for

group 1 will be as follows;
(new)

f%n

= 3 + 0.05 ((5-3) + (3-3) + (2-3) + (1-3))

J V ( n C W ) = 3+ 0.05 (-1) = 2.95
After recalculating the centroid, group 1 has the new centroid 2.95. Group 2 centroid
remains unchanged as no objects are assigned to it. Our new matrix for first iteration is
shown in Figure 20.

u

^

5

6

£i
2.95

£i
2

3

6

2.95

2

2

3

2.95

2

1

1

2.95

2

Figure 20: Matrix records for iterationl

The next object (R2) will now be allocated to a cluster. The object-centroid distance is
now calculated as shown in No. 2.
D, (Mj,C,) = V {(6-2.95)2 + (6-2.95)2 + (3-2.95)2 + (1-2.95)2 } = ^ 2 2 . 4 1 = 4 - 7 3
D, (Mj, C2) = yj {(6-2)2 + (6-2)2 + (3-2)2 + (1-2)2 } = ^34 = 5.83
Di represents distance at iteration 1.
Dl = [4.73

5.83]

Based on the minimum distance, Con2 is assigned to group 1.
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c

r

1

= group 1
= group 2

Table 18: Object clustering generating cluster (CO

The two records Coni and Con2 are now assigned to group 1. New centroid for group 1 is
recomputed, group 2 centroid will still remain the same since no object is assigned to it.
The re-computation of cluster centroid continues until each group remains unchanged.
•

To separate intrusive objects from normal instances;
Find the largest cluster, i.e., the one with the most number of instances, and
label it normal. Assume its centroid is /u0.

•

Sort the remaining clusters in ascending order of the distance from each cluster
centroid to //0. Within a cluster, sort the data instances in the same way (i.e.,
ascending order of distance from each data instance to ju0).

•

Select all clusters that have a distance (to ju0) greater than rjD, and label them as
intrusive where D is the largest distance from the centroid of the largest cluster to
the farthest instance in ij and rj is the portion of the instances farthest away from
the largest cluster.

•

Label all the other instances as attacks.

Assume group 1 is the largest cluster with a centroid \i0 of 3. D is 3.23 and rj = 0.17 then
yD = 0.55. So it means that any cluster that the distance from centroid u.0 of group 1 is
greater than 0.55 will be labeled as intrusive cluster.
To measure the performance (accuracy) of the proposed clustering-based intrusion
detection approach, they ask a wireless network expert to assign normal or intrusive label
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to each cluster. The expert was given the average statistics of each feature for a cluster,
but not the distance relationship between clusters. The expert categorized each cluster
solely based on his understanding of the relationship between metrics and attacks. The set
of expert-assigned labels are then used as the "ground truth" for the evaluation of their
clustering based methods. They have done experiments on their system with three weeks
datasets and claimed that the effectiveness of the clustering-based wireless intrusion
detection method was validated.

2.6.2. A Hybrid IDS for Wireless Intrusion Detection using Association
Rule Mining
In [LLM+07] a novel hybrid anomaly detection approach is proposed which incorporates
the association rule mining technique and cross feature mining to build normal behavior
profiles of network activities for an individual node. The association-rule mining
technique is applied on data collected on cross-layer features, while the cross-feature
mining is applied on data collected on statistical features.
The proposed system is built on four major components: data collection module, profile
module, detection module and decision module.
Data Collection Module:
This module collects network data according to the proposed two feature sets within radio
transmission range. The two proposed feature sets are cross-layer feature set and
statistical feature set. Examples of cross layer feature set are sourcelP, destinationIP,
MAC frame type (RTS/ CTS/ DATA/ ACK), flow direction (SEND/ RECV/ DROP) and
type of packet (data/ control). Examples of statistical feature set are time, inbound traffic
data, outbound traffic data, transmit traffic rate or receive traffic rate. For example,
suppose in a specified duration the data collection module collects the following data
specified in Table 19 and Table 20.

66

WiFi Miner: An Online Apriori and Sensor Based Wireless Network Intrusion Detection System

Time

Inbound/ Outbound Transmit/ Receive Traffic rate where r is specified threshold

Tl

Outbound

Transmit < r

T2

Outbound

Transmit < r

T3

Inbound

Receive < r

T4

Outbound

Transmit > r
Table 19: Example of data collected over statistical feature set

Source IP Dest. IP MAC frame type Flow Direction Packet Type
IP1

IP2

DATA

SEND

DATA

IP1

IP2

DATA

SEND

DATA

IP2

IP1

ACK

RCV

CTR

IP3

IP1

CTS

SEND

CTR

Table 20: Example of sample data collected over cross-layer feature set

Profile Module:
There are two subsystems in this module, one is a pre-processor and the other is a
profiler. The pre-processor transforms training data into market basket format. Then, the
profiler uses Apriori algorithm to find association patterns (rules) from the market basket
data. Each test data event (i.e. a transaction record in the converted market basket data)
can then be classified according to the normal profile in the succeeding anomaly
detection module. For illustration and example, the preprocessor transforms Table 19 into
Table 21, which is in market basket format and Table 20 is transformed into Table 22. In
Table 21, 'O' represents outbound traffic, T represents inbound traffic, 'Ij' represents
the instance where transmit/ receive rate < r and '12' represents the instance where
transmit/ receive rate > r.
Connection ID Features
C001

Ti,0,I,

C002

T2, O, I,

C003

T 3 ,1, Ii

C004

T4, O, I 2

Table 21: Market basket format of Table 19
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Now suppose source IP IPi is represented by A, IP2 by B, IP3 by C; destination IP IP] by
D, IP 2 by E; in MAC frame type DATA frame by F, ACK frame by G, CTS frame by H;
in flow direction SEND by S, RCV by R and in packet type data packet by M and CTR
packet is represented by N, then the market basket format of Table 20 can be represented
by Table 22.

Connection no. Features
C001

A, E, F, S, M

C002

A, E, F, S, M

C003

B, D, G, R, M

C004

C, D, H, S, N

Table 22: Market basket format of Table 20

After pre-processor module converts the data into market basket format, then the profiler
applies Apriori algorithm into the market basket data. For example, suppose Apriori
algorithm is applied into Table 18 with support rate 50% and confidence 50% and we get
a rule like O -> i! and from Table 21 we can get a rule like F -> M, which is actually
MAC frame: Data -> Packet type: DATA. Now these rules are forwarded to the next
module, which is detection module.

Detection Module:
Anomaly detection is to detect deviance from the norm. In other words, it discovers
previously unknown behavior patterns. For association-rule mining, rules extracted from
test data are compared with the rules in the expected normal profile. Any new rule or rule
with deviations beyond the corresponding support and confidence threshold intervals is
considered as an anomaly rule. After detection, profiles are updated accordingly. For example,
in the normal profile, if the rule O -^ l\ is not present, then it could be detected as an anomalous
rule.
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Decision Module:
In association-rule analysis, a detecting node can trigger a local alert when it detects
anomaly rules with high support and confidence values. The detecting node can then send
a global alert to warn its neighbors. When a detecting node detects anomaly rule with low
support and confidence values, it can engage a collaborative decision-making process that
incorporate intelligence (global alerts) from its neighbors. For example, if the anomalous
rule O -> I] exceeds the specified support and confidence threshold then the system
would issue an alert and will update the main profile (which means global alert). If the
support and confidence rate is low then it would compare it with other rules found from
other sensors and then will issue an alert if necessary.

In this research [LLM+07] a novel hybrid anomaly intrusion detection approach was
proposed for wireless ad-hoc networks. The author developed a prototype system to show
that the proposed approach can detect a variety of attacks as long as they cause MAC
layer misbehavior and/ or network layer misbehavior.
Current wireless IDSs are still dependent on training data and without prior training these
systems cannot detect intrusions in real time and some wireless IDS based on Association
rule mining technique [LLM+07] detect intrusions only for ad-hoc network and not
applicable for infrastructure based WLAN. Some other wireless IDS [ZKN05] used
clustering technique which is heavily dependent on a lot of calculation and also
converting all connection records to an appropriate axis point is also critical. So, in our
thesis we have focused on these issues and derived an effective approach, where we no
longer need any training data and our Online Apriori based algorithm is easy to
understand and implement while providing the efficiency and accuracy.
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3. PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR WIRELESS INTRUSION
DETECTION
This chapter gives details of the proposed algorithm and the system workflow used in
WiFi-Miner, which can detect anomalies in Wireless LAN successfully. It uses
Association rule mining technique based on the Apriori [ISA93] algorithm, which is the
core of this thesis. To get the wireless traffic we have used wireless hardware sensors
from NetworkChemistry [NC07] vendor. The details on why we choose Apriori based
system are discussed in section [2.2.5].
Association rule has been used extensively in the field of network intrusion detection
from early 2000. Since then Apriori algorithm has got a lot of attention among the
researchers. All the work that involve Association rule mining in Network Intrusion
detection deal with Apriori algorithm: with the help of Apriori or its improved version
[SON95] [HPY+04] [MC03][Yo03], they, at first detect frequent patterns from a safe
database, then train the classifiers with these frequent patterns. After that they check any
incoming network connections with these safe frequent patterns, if there is a match it is
safe otherwise it is an anomaly.
In this thesis, we proposed an algorithm called WiFi Miner, which finds infrequent
patterns in parallel of finding frequent patterns without any training phase. Instead of
comparing each incoming record with previously found frequent patterns from the
training phase, our proposed system assigns an anomaly score to each record based on the
presence of frequent and infrequent patterns in that record. Connection records with
positive anomaly score have more infrequent patterns than frequent patterns and are
flagged as anomalous packets on the fly.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 3.1 gives an overview of the
proposed system, section 3.2 discusses the Input and Preprocessor module, section 3.3
focuses on Anomaly Detection module and section 3.4 provides a simple example
application of the Apriori-Infrequent and anomaly Score Calculation.
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3.1. Overview of the proposed System
The proposed WiFi Miner system framework comprises of three main modules
[REA08]1. They are: Input Module, Preprocessor Module, and Anomaly Detection
Module as shown in figure 21. The proprietary Network Chemistry wireless hardware
sensors [NC07] first need to be properly installed and configured before they can be used
to capture wireless network packets. Installing the sensors entails installing both a sensor
server and sensor client software systems and logging on to the sensor client software
console system to initialize and configure the sensors. Input Module consisting of
properly configured hardware sensors, collects network traffic data from hardware
wireless sensors attached to the system, which capture data from airwaves as most of the
wireless attacks may occur before data are in wired network and Access Points. The
Preprocessor Module converts the raw data to readable format with the help of
CommView for WiFi [CV07] software, which is used to extract sensed data from the
hardware sensor's firebird database and saved in a .csv file (csv stands for Comma
Seperated Values where attributes values are simple text separated by commas). With
CommView, necessary features can be extracted for analyses to detect anomalies and
extracted records stored as text file are processed directly by our WiFi Miner system.
These records may also be logged into database tables for more offline processing and
possible tracking of anomalous records. The focus of our approach is online processing,
that is independent of training data. After the data are preprocessed, they are sent to the
Anomaly Detection Module, which includes the core algorithm (Apriori-Infrequent) for
finding infrequent patterns or anomalies.

' This paper [REA08] is from this thesis work.
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Anomaly Detection

Extracts necessary
attribute values
from wireless
sensor log with
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a csv file

Detects anomalous
connection records as
anomaly with help of
Real-time Online
Apriori-lnfrequent
algorithm

Figure 21: System workflow

The proposed Online Apriori-lnfrequent algorithm contributes by
1. Providing a mechanism for computing the anomaly scores of a record, that is
based on the relative sizes and numbers of infrequent and frequent itemsets
contained in just this record without the need for hard-to-get training data. This is
based on the premise that infrequent itemsets are likely anomalous as is the case
with many wireless attacks.
2. Providing a smart-join mechanism that improves the Apriori-gen join step and
prune steps when computing candidate itemsets, which speeds up infrequent and
frequent pattern generations.
3. Providing a mechanism that eliminates the need to generate association rules from
frequent patterns in order to detect anomalies.

The WiFi Miner algorithm is presented as Algorithm 1 in figure 22. The proposed
scheme finds anomaly/infrequent patterns without training classifiers offline with safe
data. Instead of finding frequent patterns at first and then comparing these patterns with
incoming data to detect the anomalies during third step, our method finds the infrequent
data/anomalies during the first step with an online Apriori-lnfrequent algorithm, which
tries to find both infrequent patterns and frequent patterns, improves candidate set
generation scheme in one step by improving the runtime complexity of Joining and
Pruning. The rest of the chapter describes both the Online Apriori-lnfrequent algorithm
and the Anomaly scoring scheme adopted by the proposed WiFi Miner system.
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Algorithm 1. (WiFi Miner: Wireless IDS)
Algorithm WiFi Miner()
Input: Network connection packets (P), sensors (S), access points (AP)
Output: Anomalous connections (A)
begin
While (true)
(1) Capture wireless packets from AP using sensors (S)
(2) Extract connection packets (P) from sensors S with
Commview for WiFi software and save as xsvfile
(3) Call Apriori-Infrequent Algorithm with
"Incoming-connection" .csvfile records as input
and output anomalous records (A) as alerts.
end
Figure 22: Algorithm 1 - WiFi Miner Workflow

3.2.

Input and Preprocessor Module

Our Input module contains the proprietary Network Chemistry wireless hardware sensors
[NC07] and Preprocessor module contains the Commview for WiFi [CV07] software.
The goal of the input module is to capture wireless network packets successfully from a
selected Access Point (AP) and log them into the hardware sensor's Firebird database.
Then the preprocessor module converts the raw data to readable format with help of
CommView for WiFi software and outputs a csv file. So, for a functional Input and
Preprocessor module we need to properly install and configure 1) Wireless Access Point,
2) Wireless hardware sensors (both a sensor server and a sensor client software), 3)
CommView for WiFi software as shown in figure 23.
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Figure 23: Input Module and Preprocessor Module

Clients connect to the wireless network through Access Point and our sensors are
configured and associated with the AP, so that, the sensor can capture all the packets sent
by the client to the AP. In this way, we ensure that all packets from clients that pass
through our network are captured by the sensor. Sensors receive and analyze all 802.11
packets, analyze the data, and send processed data to the Server, where the information is
stored. For the Sensors to perform their function, we installed and configured RFprotect
Server and Client software of Network Chemistry Sensors.
The RFprotect Server analyzes, stores, and integrates data from Sensors. The Server
comprises the RFprotect Engine, a database of known stations, experts, location analysis,
alerts, and reported events. The Server consolidates and analyzes wireless traffic,
generates alerts and maintains a database for the RFprotect console users.
The Console (client) provides the information presentation and operator controls for
RFprotect. The Console is the main suite of tools for viewing and managing the
information provided by the RFprotect Server and Sensors, and provides views of
wireless activity, security alerts, and RF environmental analysis.
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3.2.1.

Network Chemistry Sensor Software Installation Process

The minimum requirements for installing the Sensor software are as follows:
•

Windows XP, 2000, 2003 or Linux operating system

•

2.4GHz or greater CPU

•

1GByte memory

Hardware configuration of our system for Sensor Server and Client Installation:
•

Windows XP Professional Operating System Service pack 2

•

Pentium 4 CPU 3.06 GHZ

•

1 GB RAM

•

150 GB of Hard disk

Sensor Software installation steps:
The software installation is easy. We first installed the server software before the client.
With the software CD inside the CDROM drive, we started the RFprotectServer and the
installer displays a Welcome screen dialog box. Select all the default and continue
clicking "Next" until completing the RFprotectServer setup wizard then click Finish and
then proceed to creating the database wizard. We also choose the default for the database
creation which uses firebird. The RFprotectClient installation is also easy. We selected all
the default for this installation.
Configuring Sensors:
After installation we launch the RFprotectClient, as shown in figure 24, and then we enter
the password.
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Network Chemistry HFpi " I i*« I f i m i n

RFprotect Console Login
Client/Server Edition
Version: 5.0.6
Connect | Advanced}
Choose the server to connect to from the drop down list, or enter the
connection settings for a new server.
Server

3

llocalhost

Username jSYSDBA
Password r

Cancel

Connect

Figure 24: RFProtect Login Window

The screen in figure 25 will appear showing that no sensor has been added. To add a
sensor, we click on the Add sensor button, then the discover sensor window as shown in
figure 26 is open.
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Figure 26: Discover Sensor Window

We double-click our Sensor that we want to configure. The dialog in figure 27 appears.
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i

!

Default gateway:

Apply

Figure 27: Sensor IP address Configuration

1. Click the Address tab.
2. Click Obtain an IP address automatically using DHCP to cause Sensors to use DHCP
to get their IP address, gateway, and domain.
3. Click Apply.
4. Configure the Server address for the Sensor by clicking the Server tab
Once a Sensor is added the Configuration window first appears with the unrecognized
Sensor displayed, shown in figure 28. The lock icon indicates that the sensor is not yet
communicating with the server. Clicking the check box will make the sensor to
communicate with the server.
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Figure 28: Console window with unknown sensor

Once the sensor is configured to send data to the server, the sensor is displayed in the
Console. Figure 29 shows our sensor in a communication state.
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Figure 29: Console window with sensor

Monitoring and capturing packets
Once the sensor is configured, it is able to detect all wireless networks around it as can be
seen in figure 30 below. Then we select the AP from which we want to capture the
packets, we right click on it and select external capture as shown in figure 30.
It is worth noting here that the Network chemistry RFprotect sensor is a capture device
for Packetyzer. Packetyzer is a packet capture program that is installed with the Network
Chemistry RFprotect software. Figure 31 shows Packetyzer has been used to capture
packets in WiFiMiner. The RFprotect is a signature-based Intrusion protection system for
802.1 la/b/g wireless connections that is used to detect rogue devices, intrusion and DOS
attacks. It is not capable of detecting new or unknown attacks unless the signature of that
attack is updated in the RFprotect server.
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3.2.2.

Preprocessing phase using Commview for WiFi

After wireless packet records are successfully sensed and stored by Network Chemistry
sensors in its server database, then we can use Commview for WiFi software to export
these packet records into a csv file. Records in csv file are already preprocessed, cleaned
and organized. A sample of csv file is shown in figure 32.
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Figure 32: Sample preprocessed csv file output by Commview for WiFi

Our preprocessor, Commview for WiFi, is a powerful wireless network monitor and
analyzer for 802.11 a/b/g/n networks to pre-process captured wireless Sensor logs. With
Commview for WiFi, we can easily select which features/ attributes to be exported into
the csv file. In preprocessing phase, selecting the right features/ attributes is very
important. The core of anomaly detection in wireless network lies in selecting features
that have enough weight to detect intrusions. For example, attackers look for open ports
as a passage through which to enter the network and launch their attacks. It means that
features like Ports (source and destination), MAC address (source and destination), Total
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number of packets and the size of the packet sent in a T interval, will play a vital role in
detecting the attacks. After a detailed study of network attacks we have selected the
following feature/ attributes that we hope will be able to detect wireless attacks.
Feature/ Attribute

Definition

Frame Type/Subtype

It can be management, control, or data

SrcMAC

Source MAC Address

destMAC

Destination MAC Address

SrcIP

The source IP address

destIP

The destination IP address

Packet Size

The number of bytes

Time

Time stamp

srcPort

Source Port no

destPort

Destination Port no

. Channel

Channel number [111]
Table 23: Selected attributes/ features list for preprocessing

3.3.

Anomaly Detection Module

The core part of the WiFi Miner is Anomaly Detection Module. Once wireless
connection records are preprocessed then these preprocessed data (csv file) is sent to the
Anomaly Detection module. This module includes the core algorithm "Online-AprioriInfrequent" and mechanism to assign an anomaly score to each record to detect the
infrequent patterns or anomalies. Next three sub-sections: 3.3.1 describes the definition
and terminology used in Apriori-Infrequent algorithm, 3.3.2 describes the AprioriInfrequent algorithm and 3.3.3 describes the anomaly score calculation method.
3.3.1. Definition and Terminology

The following definitions and properties are used in the discussion of the proposed IDS
system.
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Definition 1. A record has a maximal level of n: if the record, Ri, has its largest frequent
itemset being an n-itemset or containing n distinct items. •
Definition 2. A maximal level n record has a set of frequent and infrequent itemsets:
consisting of all its 1-itemsets to n-itemsets that are frequent and infrequent
respectively. •
Definition 3. A Frequent k-itemset: is a k-itemset which has support greater than or equal
to the given minimum support with respect to the entire database stream of records. •
Definition 4. An Infrequent k-itemset: is a k-itemset which has support less than the
given minimum support with respect to the entire database stream of records and has all
its subsets frequent in levels k-1 and lower. This type of itemset is also called negative
border in some work. •
Definition 5. A maximal level n Record's Frequent Itemsets, FR: consists of the set of all
its 1-itemsets to n-itemsets, which have supports greater than or equal to the given
minimum support with respect to the entire database stream of records. •
Definition 6. A maximal level n Record's Infrequent Itemsets, IFR: consists of the set of
all its 1-itemsets to n-itemsets, which have supports less than the given minimum support
with respect to the entire database stream of records. All subsets of each level k
Infrequent set are frequent in the levels k - 1 and lower. •
Definition 7. A k-itemset Anomaly Score: The anomaly score of a level k itemset is -k if
the itemset is frequent but +k if the itemset is infrequent. •
Definition 8. A Record's Anomaly Score: The anomaly score of a maximal level n record
is the sum of all its levels 1 to n frequent and infrequent itemsets' anomaly scores. •
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Proposition 1. A Normal/Anomalous Record Property: A normal record has more
frequent than infrequent itemsets and has a negative total record anomaly score, while an
anomalous record has more infrequent than frequent itemsets and has a positive or zero
total record anomaly score. •

3.3.2. The Proposed Apriori-lnfrequent Algorithm
The goal of the Apriori-lnfrequent Algorithm is to generate all frequent patterns as well
as all infrequent patterns at every level, and be able to use this knowledge to compute
anomaly scores for records. In order to compute frequent and non-frequent itemsets
efficiently, the proposed algorithm argues that the Apriori's method for computing
candidate (i+l)-itemsets by joining all frequent i-itemsets (Lj) with themselves, if their
first (i - 1) items are the same and the first itemset comes before the second itemset in the
Lj list, can be improved on, with a third condition. The third join condition introduced by
the Apriori-lnfrequent algorithm states that an itemset in the Lj list will only be used to
join other items in the Li list that meet the first two conditions if this itemset's last item
(or ith item) appears in a joinable item list called Z list, consisting of all (i-l)th item of Lj.
The purpose of the Z list is to prevent ahead of time, the need to join itemsets which
produce itemset results that have no chance of being frequent because their subsets are
not frequent. Such itemsets in the Apriori algorithm are pruned during this step but we
avoid both creating them in the first place, computing their subsets and pruning them.
Our algorithm looks for infrequent patterns (which were frequent in the previous level but
when they are combined with some other attributes, they become infrequent). These
infrequent itemsets are similar to negative borders [MT04], but is computed in a more
efficient fashion in our online Apriori algorithm. This concept of fast detection of
infrequent pattern is useful for intrusion detection domain because suppose for example,
in connection record, Flag ACK (ACKnowledgement) is frequent but when ACK is
combined with Flag SYN (SYNchronized), it may be an attack. The formal Apriorilnfrequent algorithm is given as Algorithm 3 [Figure 34] and the Smart-Join technique it
uses is also given as Algorithm 2 [Figure 33].
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ALGORITHM 2. (Apriori-SmartJoin: Computing Candidate
Ckfrom Lk.,)
Algorithm Apriori-SmartJoin( )
Input. A list of large (k-l)-itemsets: L^-i,
Output: A list of candidate k-itemsets: Ck,
Other variables: Z-listfor smart join
begin
Ck = 0
Z = the set of all (k-2)th item in Lk.i.
for each pair ofitemsets Mand P € Lk.i do
begin
Mjoins with P to get itemset MU P
if the following conditions are satisfied,
(a) itemset M comes before itemset P in Lk.;
(b) the first k-2 items in MandP (excluding just the last item)
are the same.
(c) the last item (or (k-l)th item) of each itemset in Lk-i is
joinable only if this item is in the Z list.
if M and P are joinable then
Ck = CkUMUP
end
end
Figure 33: Algorithm: Apriori-SmartJoin

The process of Algorithm 2 is as follows:

Suppose, input to the algorithm is, L2= {AB, AC, BD, BF, CD, CF} and output of the
algorithm would be C3. So, in this example, k = 3.

At first step, C3 = 0. Then we create Z list, Z = set of 3-2 = 1st item in L2. So, Z = {A, B,
C}.

Then for each pair of itemset we do the following.

At first we take AB as M and AC as P. We check the following conditions:
1. AB comes before AC in L2: true
2. First one item (A) is same at both itemsets: true
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3. Last item of each itemset (B and C) is in Z list: true
Since all three conditions are true, AB and AC are joinable and we get
C3 =

0UABUAC={ABC}

Then we take AB as M and BD as P. We check the following conditions:
1. AB comes before AC in L2: true
2. First one item (A) and (B) are same at both itemsets:ya/se
3. Last item of each itemset (B and D) is in Z list: false
So, we will not join these two items and will proceed further. For the same reason, we
cannot join the following pairs of items: (AB, BF), (AB, CD), (AB, CF), (AC, BD), (AC,
BF), (AC, CD), (AC, CF), (BD, CD), (BD, CF), (BF, CD), (BF, CF). The following items
cannot be joined because of only condition 3 is not satisfied: (BD, BF) and (CD, CF).
Following is the algorithm for Apriori-Infrequent.
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ALGORITHM 3. (Apriori-Infrequent: Computing Infrequent
Patterns)
Algorithm Apriori-Infrequent( )
Input: A list of candidate itemsets: Cj,
Minimum support count X
Output: A list of frequent itemsets: L,
Anomaly score of each record.
Other variables: A list of Infrequent itemsets: S,
begin
k=l
1. Compute frequent Lk and infrequent Sk with minimum
support Xfrom C*.
2. While (Lk ± 0) do
begin
2.1.k = k+l
2.2. Compute the next candidate set Ckfrom Lk-i
as Lk-i Apriori-smart join Lk-i
2.3. For each itemset in C* do
2.3.1. Calculate all possible subsets and prune
if not previously large
2.4.IfCk~0
then break and go to step 3
2.5. Compute frequent Lk and infrequent Sk with
minimum support Xfrom Ck2.6. Update anomaly score function with Lk and infrequent Sk
(please refer to section 3.3.3 for details)
end
3. Compute all Frequent patterns as L = L/ U ... Lk
end
Figure 34: Algorithm: Apriori-Infrequent

The process of the algorithm is explained in detail at Section 3.4 with an example
application.

3.3.3. Anomaly Score Calculation
Given a record, an anomaly score is computed from all its level 1 to level n patterns (both
frequent and non-frequent patterns), where n is the largest number of items in the
maximal frequent pattern as presented in the definitions. To compute the anomaly score
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of a record, each level k frequent pattern in the record is assigned an anomaly score of -k,
while each level k infrequent pattern is assigned an anomaly score of+k, and the anomaly
score of a record is the sum of the anomaly scores of all its frequent and infrequent
patterns. If a record's total anomaly score becomes positive, then, this record has more
infrequent than frequent patterns and is considered anomalous. On the other hand, if a
record's anomaly score is negative, then, the record has more frequent than non-frequent
patterns and is considered normal. If a record has zero anomaly score, it means it has the
same number of frequent and infrequent patterns, and for increased security, the proposed
system treats such a record as anomalous since it is safer to have a false alarm than
harmful undetected intrusion. This anomaly detection module generates anomaly alerts
for records with positive anomaly scores. The simple logic behind anomaly score weight
assignment to frequent and infrequent itemsets is that the more the number of items in an
infrequent itemset, the lower the chances of this itemset being in an arbitrary record.
Thus, the presence of an infrequent 3-itemset is more rare than the presence of an
infrequent 2-itemset in a record. Therefore, the anomaly weights of infrequent itemsets
are proportionately increased with their size levels, while those of frequent itemsets are
decreased with increasing number of items in the itemset. For example, while an
infrequent 2-itemset like AC would have an anomaly score of +2, a frequent 2-itemset
like AF would have anomaly score of -2. However, an infrequent 3-itemset would have
an anomaly score of+3, while a frequent 3-itemset would have an anomaly score of-3.
The proposed WiFi Miner system is able to calculate or give each connection packet an
anomaly score on the fly. This is an important step as it eliminates the need to generate
association rules from frequent patterns as done by many existing approaches in order to
identify intrusions. The simple anomaly score rule assigns a positive anomaly score of +n
to every n-itemset infrequent pattern in a record that is equal to the number of items in the
infrequent pattern but assigns a negative anomaly score of -n to a frequent pattern with n
items. This rule is based on the premise that certain anomalies are infrequent events that
embed themselves in frequent or normal packets. The anomaly score of each database
transaction is computed in parallel with support counting of each level candidate set of
the Apriori-Infrequent algorithm and this utilizes the records while they are still in
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memory without incurring additional I/O costs. Thus, the total anomaly score of a record
is computed as the sum of all the anomaly scores of this record's itemset level 1 to level n
frequent and infrequent patterns, where n is the last nonempty level of frequent patterns
for the record. A record is declared anomalous if its total anomaly score is zero or
positive but normal if its total anomaly score is negative.
For Example, suppose at level two we have, Frequent-2-itemsets, L2 = {AB, AC, AD}
and Infrequent-2-itemsets, S2 = {BC, CD}. Now, when we will be scanning the database
for calculating the candidate-3-itemsets, C3 for the next level, we will check each
transaction record for L2 and S2. Suppose, ith transaction, Tj = {A, B, C, D}. At this
transaction we can see that it has frequent-2-itemsets AB, AC and AD. For each frequent
itemset found we assign -2 and we can also see that it contains infrequent-2-itemsets BC
and CD. For each infrequent itemset found we assign +2. So, the anomaly score of Ti at
this level would be: -2 (AB) -2 (AC) -2 (AD) +2 (BC) +2 (CD) = -2. The final anomaly
score of Ti would be the sum of all anomaly score calculated at each level. After getting
final anomaly score of a transaction, if the score is Zero or Positive, we can say it as an
anomalous record and if the score is negative, we can consider it as a frequent record.

3.4.
Example Application of the Apriori-lnfrequent and
Anomaly Score
Assume that wireless network connection records were captured and preprocessed to
produce a database transaction table similar to columns one and two of Table 3, with
candidate 1-items as {A, B, C, D, E, F}. In pre-processed wireless packets or records, the
attributes depicted as A to F above would represent connection features like: connection
date and time, source and Destination MAC address, packet size in bytes, access point
MAC address (BSSID), Frame Type/Subtype, transmission rate, Client/AP sequence
number, signal power, access point name, source type (station or access point), channel,
etc.
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TID

Anomaly Score

Items
Pass 1

Pass2

Final Score

1

ABD

-3+0 = -3

-4+2 = -2

-5

2

ACEF

-2+2 = 0

-2+10 = +8

+8

3

BCDF

-3+1 = -2

-4+8 - +4

+2

4

ABCD

-4+0 = -4

-8+4 = -4

-8

5

ABCE

-3+1 = -2

-6+6 = 0

-2

Table 24: Database records Anomaly Score

Example 1: Using the WiFi Miner Apriori-Infrequent and Anomaly score counting
technique, identify the anomaly or alert records from Table 24 (first two columns) if the
minimum support threshold is 60% or 3 out of 5 transactions.
Solution 1: Applying Algorithm 3 (figure 34), d = {A:4, B:4, C:4,D:3, E:2, F:2}, and L,
= {A, B, C, D} with anomaly score each of-1 and Si = {E, F} with anomaly score each
of+1. The anomaly scores of the transactions in the database table are computed at this
level as: TID 1, ABD has an anomaly score of-1(A) -1(B) -1(D) - -3. TID 2, ACEF has
an anomaly score of-1(A) -1(C) +1(E) +1(F) = 0. The anomaly scores of transactions 3, 4
and 5 are respectively: -2, -4, and -2. Next, we compute C2 as Li Apriori-gen join Li
since the Z list at this level is still empty set. Thus, C2 = {AB:3, AC:3, AD:2, BC:3,
BD:3, CD:2}. L2 is computed as {AB, AC, BC, BD} with anomaly score of-2 each,
while S2 is computed as {AD,CD} with anomaly score of+2 each. The anomaly scores of
the database transactions are updated as: Tid 1 (ABD) = -3(score from previous step) 2(AB) +2(AD) -2(BD) = -5. Tid 2 (ACEF) = 0(score from previous step) - 2(AC) +2(AE)
+2(AF) +2(CE) +2(CF) +2(EF) = +8. The rest of the anomaly scores are updated as
shown in column 4 of table 24. During iteration 3, to create C3 list, the Z list is first
created from L2 as item (2 -1) or the first item in each L2 itemset. Thus, Z = {A, B}. To
join an L2 itemset, if the last element of the itemset is not in the Z list, then, we should
not perform the join. This means that we first reduce our L2= {AB, AC, AD, BC, BD,
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CD} to {AB} since AC, AD, BC, BD and CD do not have their last elements in the Z list.
Thus, our C3 = {AB} Apriori-gen join {AB} = 0; Since C3 = 0; as well as L3 = 0, the
algorithm ends without computing the anomaly score for this iteration. All records with
negative anomaly scores are normal while those with positive or zero anomaly scores are
alerts. The final anomaly scores of the example connection records are as given in
Column 5 of Table 24.
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4. EXPERIMENTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We developed WiFi Miner with JAVA language under Windows platform. This
prototype system consists of all modules and algorithms described in Chapter 3. We used
hardware sensor to capture wireless connection records before they reach the access
point, then these captured records are preprocessed by Commview for WiFi software,
which outputs the csv file. At last Anomaly Detection Module used this csv file to flag
anomalous connection records.
The main objective of this experiment is to prove that WiFi Miner is capable of detecting
more kinds of wireless attacks at a lower cost. We compared our system with SnortWireless [Loc05], which is the only open source wireless IDS and ADAM [BCJ+01],
which uses the Apriori and association rule algorithm. Due to the unavailability of
labeled wireless data, we crafted our own packets to test the system.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 4.1 describes our experimental
setup, section 4.2 describes how we crafted the attack packets of different types and
section 4.3 describes the test results and performance evaluation of our system.

4.1.

Experimental Setup

Our testing environment consists of three computers (PCI, PC2 and PC3), one access
point (API) and one wireless sensor (Network Chemistry sensor). We installed Network
Chemistry sensor and Commview for WiFi in PCI from where we scanned all Access
Points in ranges and selected the AP for our wireless network and started capturing
packets from our Access Point. We created a wireless network with PC2 and PC3 where
both were connected to API. PC2 is the attacker PC and PC3 is the victim PC. The
topology of the network setup is depicted in figure 35.
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Victim PC

PCI captures all data
sent between PC2
and PC3 through
sensor and PCI is
equiped with WiFi
Miner

Attacker P C

Figure 35: Experimental Network Setup

The hardware configurations of these PCs are as below:
PCI: Intel Centrino 1.50 GHz, 512 MB Ram, 60 GB Hard Drive
PC2: Intel Pentium 4, 3.07 GHz, 1.0 GB Ram, 149 GB Hard Drive
PC3: Intel Pentium 4 1.50 GHz, 512 MB Ram, 120 GB Hard Drive

4.2.

Attacks Used in

Experiment

As described in section 1.4.7, wireless intrusions can be classified into four groups
namely: Passive Attacks, Active Attacks, Man-in-the-Middle Attacks and Jamming
Attacks. Since Jamming Attacks are not very common in nature because of the expense
of acquiring hardware capable of launching jamming attacks, we will not consider this
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kind of attacks in our experiments. To ensure that our system is capable of detecting
wireless intrusions, we crafted attacks of the following types:
1. Passive Attacks (WEP Crack attacks and Port scanning attacks)
2. Active Attacks (SYN Flood attacks and UDP Flood attacks) and
3. Man-In-The-Middle Attacks (Rogue AP attacks)
In rest of the section we will discuss about crafting these attack packets.
Passive Attacks
To test our system with WEP Cracking attack, we have used BackTrack network security
suite [BT07]. BackTrack is a Linux distribution distributed as a Live CD and includes
over 300 security tools that can be used in crafting attacks. Any Windows OS PC can be
booted into linux mode to use these security tools with BackTrack CD.
At first we captured some packets from our Access Point (WiFiMiner) and from there we
spoofed a valid client's MAC address. Then we started BackTrack security tool and using
the Aireplay [Air07a] utility we sent authentication and association request to WiFiMiner
AP (figure 36). The command was:
Aireplay-ng-1 0-e WiFiMiner-a 00:14:Dl:3A:71:E4-h 00:0E:35:07:A7:FCethO
Here, -1 means attack mode, 0 means continuously, -e is the option for SSID of target
AP, -a specify the target AP's MAC, -h specifies source MAC and ethO is the network
card.
Then we started sending fake ARP packets to WiFiMiner AP so that we can capture the
replies through Airodump (figure 37). Once we have captured enough packets then we
started Aircrack utility of decrypt the WEP key (Figure 38). Figure 39 shows the
processing of data to find the WEP key. Within 15 minutes time frame Aircrack
decrypted the WEP key (Figure 40).
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Our sensor captured all these fake ARP packets and we preprocessed these packets with
Commview software and it generated a csv file containing these attack packets (figure
41).
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Figure 39: Processing of data to find the WEP key
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Figure 41: Fake ARP packets captured and preprocessed by WiFiMiner

The log of these crafted passive attack packets can be
found
http://cs.uwindsor.ca/~woddlab/sensor_mine/wifi_miner/passive_attack_log.csv.

at

Active Attacks

To test active attacks, we have used Engage Packet Builder [Eng07] software to craft
attack packets for SYN Flood and UDP Flood attacks. The signature we used to craft
these attack packets were as follows:

SYN Flood: flag = SYN, dest-host — victim (same), dest-service = vulnerable port (same)
UDP Flood: dst-host = victim (same), dst-service = vulnerable port/random port
In SYN Flood attack, the attacker sends a lot of TCP packets, where both SYN and
(ACKnowledgment) ACK flags in the header are set to 1 using Engage Packet Builder.
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The attacker's IP address is faked and destination IP address is the server victim's
address. Receiving so many packets from attacker prevents victim from accepting new
legitimate requests and may crash the victim server. To craft these attack packets we open
the Engage Packet Builder software and specify the Network Interface card at top left
corner and select the tab for TCP packets at top right comer. Then put some fake IP
address (192.168.1.199) at the place of source IP address and at destination IP address we
put the victim's IP address (192.168.1.101). At source port we put some arbitrary port
number (100) and destination port is some vulnerable port (80). At the flags tab at the
interface we set SYN and ACK. Then we start the web server by clicking the button at
low right corner. Then we specify the number of packets to be sent at Nb of Packets: 100.
Then we press SEND button and it will start sending the TCP SYN Flood attack packets
to the victim's PC. The interface for creating the TCP SYN Flood attack is shown in
Figure 42. To create UDP flood packets, we need to go to the UDP tab besides TCP tab
and specify random destination port at each time and send UDP flood packets to the
victim's PC. Interface for creating UDP Flood packets is shown in figure 43.
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Once these attack packets are sent to the victim's PC we can capture these attack packets
from the PC equipped with sensor and Commview. Figure 44 shows that we have
successfully captured and preprocessed SYN Flood attack packets with Commview for
WiFi and Figure 45 shows that of UDP Flood Attack packets.
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The log of these crafted active attack packets can be found
http://cs.uwindsor.ca/~woddlab/sensor_mine/wifi_miner/active_attack_log.csv.

at

Man-In-The-Middle Attacks
To gather attack packets for Man-In-the-Middle type of attack, we set up a rogue AP with
the same SSID (Service Set Identifier) as the legitimate one in a place nearer than the
legitimate AP. To be successful with this attack we placed the rouge AP at least 5
channels away from the legitimate AP. Then, using the spoofed client's MAC address we
sent de-authentication packets using Aireplay of BackTrack security tool. As a result, the
targeted client is disconnected from the legitimate AP and is connected to the rogue AP
because of the stronger signal.
In our experiment the legitimate AP was WiFiMiner (MAC address: 00-14-D1-3A-71E4) operating at channel 3 and the victim's MAC address was 00-1F-3A-57-5A-49,
which was connected to the legitimate AP. We placed another router with the same SSID
(WiFiMiner) at channel 10 and placed it near victim's PC. Initially no PC was connected
to the rogue AP. Then from another PC booted with BackTrack, we launched Aireplay
and issued the following command as shown in figure 46:
aireplay-ng -0 100 -a 00:14:D1:3A:71:E4 -c 00:1F:3A:57:5A:49 athO
Here, -0 means deauthentication, 100 is the number of deauthentication packet to be sent,
-a 00:14:Dl:3A:71:E4is the legitimate AP's MAC address, -c 00:1F:3A:57:5A:49 is
victim's MAC address and athO is the network card in use. This step is shown in Figure
45. As a result, the targeted host disconnect from the legitimate AP. The disconnected
victim PC then rescans wireless channels and connects to the rogue AP.
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Figure 46: Sending Deauthentication packets to the legitimate AP

These de-authentication packets were captured and gathered as anomalous packets with
Commview for WiFi software as shown in figure 47.
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Figure 47: Deauthentication packets captured by Commview

The log of these crafted Man-In-The-Middle attack packets can be found at
http://cs.uwindsor.ca/~woddlab/sensor_mine/wifi_miner/mim_attack_log.csv.

4.3.

Test Result and Performance Evaluation

At first, we have compared the runtime of our algorithm: Real-time Online AprioriInfrequent Algorithm with traditional Apriori algorithm concept used in ADAM and
noticed an around 35% increase in execution time efficiency in our algorithm as shown in
Figure 48. This is because we are not generating association rules with confidence value
and also we have improved the join and prune sections of the algorithm with our SmartJoin approach. It should be stated here that from analysis and experiments, the proposed
Online Apriori with smart join produces complete and correct frequent and infrequent
patterns as the regular Apriori algorithm given the same datasets.
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Then, to test the system with these anomalous packets crafted at Section 4.2, at first we
have generated some innocent packets between PC2 and PC3 in figure 35. These packets
were generated as a result of some innocent web browsing. Within 5 minutes time
window we have captured around 19,500 packets. Figure 49 shows that we captured these
packets with the Network Chemistry sensor (log of these innocent packets can be found
at http://cs.uwindsor.ca/~woddlab/sensor_mine/wifi_miner/innocent_log.cap). Then we
preprocessed these data with Commview for WiFi software (log of these preprocessed
data

can

also

be

found

http://cs.uwindsor.ca/~woddlab/sensor_mine/wifi_miner/innocent_log.csv) (figure 50).
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Figure 50: Preprocessed innocent packets (A complete log can be found @
http://cs.uwindsor.ca/~woddlab/sensor_mine/wifi_miner/innocent_log.csv)

After that we collected 500 anomalous packets (200 packets from passive attacks, 200
packets from active attacks and 100 packets from Man-in-the-middle attacks) and mixed
these anomalous packets with innocent packets and input the total combined dataset into
our Anomaly Detection Module where we run the Apriori-Infrequent algorithm. A
complete

log

of

these

crafted

attack

packets

can

be

found

at

http://cs.uwindsor.ca/~woddlab/sensor_mine/wifi_miner/attack_log.csv.
The algorithm outputs some packets as alert which have positive anomaly score, and then
we check these alert records if they really belong to the group of 500 anomaly packets to
calculate the anomaly detection rate and false alarm rate. We tested the same dataset with
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SNORT Wireless and traditional Apriori based system ADAM to compare our system
with these two existing system.
(Out of 500 Attacks)

Detected
WiFi Miner

SNORT Wireless

ADAM

Attacks Detected

433

335

377

False Alarm

180

292

248

Table 25: Attacks Detected and False Alarm Comparison

450

I Delected Attacks
I False Alarm

WtfiMiaier

SnortWireless

ADAM

Wireless IDS
Figure 51: Comparison of Attacks detected and false alarm rate
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3 Algorithms

Detected

Passive Attacks
(200 Attacks)
Active Attacks
(200 Attacks)
Man-In-The-Middle
Attacks
(100 Attacks)

WiFi Miner
179(89.5%)

SNORT Wireless
138 (69%)

ADAM
161 (80.5%)

171 (85.5%)

145 (72.5%)

151(75.5%)

83 (83%)

52 (52%)

65 (65%)

Table 26: Specific Attacks Detection Comparison
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Figure 52 Specific attacks comparisons of WiFi Miner with SNORT Wireless and ADAM

Result Analysis:
From Table 25, we can see that our proposed system, WiFi Miner, performed better than
SNORT Wireless and ADAM and false alarm rate is also reduced. The experiment also
shows that without any training data our system can perform well and can detect intrusive
packets efficiently.
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Table 26, gives a detailed view of specific attack detection rate. From there we can see
that WiFi Miner performed better at detecting passive attacks (detection rate is 89.5%)
•than detecting active attacks (85.5%). In case of Man-In-The-Middle attack, WiFi Miner
detected 83% of attacks which is lower than detection rate of other two types of attacks
but still in comparison to SNORT Wireless and ADAM, it performed better.
Currently, the proposed WiFi Miner system has no mechanism for detecting Jamming
Wireless attacks. Also, if the minimum support is set too low, there may be large number
of frequent itemsets and fewer infrequent itemsets. As a result, attacks may go
undetected. Experiments show that for this wireless intrusion detection domain, a good
choice of minimum support is 60% or more. Future work should explore improving
efficiency of the system, handling more types of attacks and further reduction of false
alarms.
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5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper proposes a wireless intrusion detection system: WiFi Miner, which uses
Apriori-Infrequent based algorithm to detect infrequent patterns, then our algorithm
designed for Anomaly Score Calculation, assigns a score to each wireless packet. Positive
or zero anomaly score in a specific

connection record means that more

infrequent/anomalous patterns are found in that record than frequent patterns while a
negative anomaly score indicates a normal packet. We have also used proprietary
Network Chemistry hardware sensors to capture real-time traffic in order to improve
intrusion response time.

Our system is different from existing wireless intrusion systems, since it eliminates the
need for hard-to-get training data and detects intrusions in real time. Also, like other
existing wireless intrusion systems, it captures the packets from airwaves while wired
IDSs use net-flow data from routers. Thus, the major contribution of our system is that it
can detect anomalous packets in real time without any training phase. We have tested our
system with crafted intrusions and compared it with other two systems and found our
system to be more efficient. Another major contribution is that we have introduced
Smart-Join, which is an improved version of Join and Pruning steps in original Apriori
algorithm.
The only critical step in this system is choosing the right support rate. Because, if the
support rate is not chosen correctly or if it is set too low, then the false alarm rate will
increase significantly as normal and innocent packets will also be flagged as alerts. Based
on our study, we recommend minimum support rate 60% to be suitable for this system.
Right now our system is not capable of detecting any kind of Jamming Attacks.
In the future, we plan to enhance our system to work with many access points, currently it
is capable of handling wireless connection records from one access point although our
sensors are capable of finding all APs in their ranges. We are also working towards
making our system generalized so that it can be used for both wired and wireless
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intrusion detection. Other future works include applying this online intrusion detection
system approach to other domains like environment pollution monitoring systems where
excessive levels of pollution can quickly raise alerts as anomalies from sensor captured
data.
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